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BINARY SEARCHES AND THE CENTRAL
MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
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INTRODUCTION
Few constitutional commands offer less textual guidance than the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable search and seizure.”1 One scholar called
this phrase “about the most unhelpful guidepost one could have concocted . . . .
[R]easonableness as an analytical concept is maddeningly frustrating.”2 It may come
as little surprise that Fourth Amendment doctrine, constructed with so little textual
guidance, strikes many as chaotic; numerous commentators have long regarded Fourth
Amendment doctrine as deeply confused, if not chaotic.3 Identifying an intelligible
principle to animate the concept of constitutional “reasonableness” is accordingly
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Jessica Bagdanov, Dallis Warshaw, Isa Lang, Zachariah Moura, and the staff of the Chapman
University School of Law’s Rinker Law Library for enormously capable research assistance.
Versions of this paper were presented at workshops at the annual meeting of the Southeastern
Association of Law Schools and the Privacy Law Scholars Conference, and the author is
grateful to the participants for many helpful comments. Special thanks are owed to Tom Bell,
Mark Blitz, Scott Howe, Michael Mannheimer, and George Thomas for their powerful insights.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 WIS. L. REV.
655, 656–57.
3 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 1 (1997); Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and
the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1149, 1149 (1998); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 349–50 (1974); Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Require-
ment: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 474–75 (1991); Craig
M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468–70 (1985);
Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L.
REV. 977, 978; Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The
Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 364–68 (1973); Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the
Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603, 603 (1982); Scott E.
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry,
72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 383–86 (1988); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The
Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 19–20 (1988); Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 49–50 (1974); Larry W. Yackle,
The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 335, 427 (1978).
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of considerable importance. A principled and coherent Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence surely requires an equally principled and coherent conception of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness.
Justice Brennan once famously identified protection for “criticism of official
conduct” as “the central meaning of the First Amendment,”4 a point to which the
Court repeatedly turned in the subsequent doctrinal evolution of the constitutional
protection for freedom of speech.5 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would surely
benefit if a similar polestar were identified. To be sure, some commentators, most
prominently Cass Sunstein, argue for judicial minimalism—narrow and incom-
pletely theorized decisions that can enhance deliberative democracy and reduce risks
of error.6 Even Professor Sunstein, however, does not embrace minimalism when
its consequence is doctrinal confusion.7 Sometimes, an incompletely theorized deci-
sion may be a virtue; on other occasions, it may produce chaos.
The need for doctrinal coherence is particularly great at present, when Fourth
Amendment law faces so many challenges borne of advancing technology. Consider
what some courts and commentators have called a “binary” search, in which an in-
vestigative technique discloses no more than probable cause to believe a particular
location otherwise hidden from public contains contraband.8 At present, issues relat-
ing to binary searches arise most frequently in litigation about whether the Fourth
Amendment permits the use of trained narcotics-detection dogs to determine whether
contraband is present in a location otherwise concealed from public view.9 The binary
4 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
5 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534–35 (2001); Phila. Newspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 771–78 (1986); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342–48
(1974). For the seminal commentary on the significance of Justice Brennan’s observation for
First Amendment doctrine, see generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A
Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191.
6 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 3–54 (1999) (describing and defending judicial minimalism).
7 See id. at 54–57 (describing the problems with judicial minimalism).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Stabler v. State,
990 So. 2d 1258, 1261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), quashed and remanded, 90 So. 3d 267
(Fla. 2012); State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); People v.
Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 55–57 (Ill. 2006); Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1030 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2003), aff’d, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004); David A. Harris, Superman’s X-Ray
Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV.
1, 36–37 (1996); Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 440–42 (2007); Ric Simmons, The Two Unan-
swered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to Make the World Safe for Binary Searches,
80 TUL. L. REV. 411, 413, 424–27 (2005).
9 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 8, at 424–27. For a discussion of the development of
electronic means of detecting scents and similar emanations through what may amount to bi-
nary search techniques, see Mary Costantino, Electronic Sniffers’ Place: The Use of Electronic
Sniffers Under the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment, 2 CHARLOTTE L.
REV. 333 (2010).
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search is not limited to this context, however, and will become of increasing import;
any technological advance that enables the authorities to identify the presence of
contraband in an otherwise concealed location would present the same constitutional
question, such as the potential development of a computer search program that could
identify the location of illegal materials, such as pirated software or child pornogra-
phy, on any computer connected to the Internet.
Justice Frankfurter, for one, saw the need for an animating principle to guide
Fourth Amendment doctrine.10 For him, the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
derived from its history, was that when discretion is afforded to law-enforcement
officers to engage in search and seizure, it is all too likely to be abused, and accord-
ingly searches and seizures not previously authorized by a warrant should be con-
demned in the absence of strict necessity.11 For a time, Justice Frankfurter’s position
seemed ascendant, as when the Court took the position that search and seizure is
constitutionally reasonable only if authorized by warrant or falling within one of the
limited exceptions to the warrant requirement.12 This insistence on warrants as a
vehicle to curb official discretion, however, did not prosper in subsequent Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Perhaps the central problem is that a warrant preference
is difficult to square with the Fourth Amendment’s text, which, rather than prefer-
ring warrants, expressly limits the authority of courts to issue them, and otherwise
requires no more than that search and seizure be “reasonable.”13 In its landmark
decision in Terry v. Ohio,14 the Court acknowledged the textual difficulty with a
warrant requirement, observing that, although the text of the Fourth Amendment
forbids the issuance of a warrant in the absence of probable cause, when the police
act without a warrant, “there is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness other
than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search
10 See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 399 U.S. 56, 70–75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
11 See id. at 70 (“With all respect I suggest that it makes a mockery of the Fourth Amend-
ment to sanction search without a search warrant.”). For a more recent statement along the
same lines, see Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 197, 228–47 (1993).
12 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971) (plurality opin-
ion); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 370–71
(1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967); United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102, 105–07 (1965).
13 The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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[or seizure] entails.’”15 Applying that test, the Court held that a brief detention and
protective search of an individual comports with the Fourth Amendment “where a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.”16
Nothing illustrates the failure of Justice Frankfurter’s advocacy of a warrant
requirement to cabin official discretion more vividly than the Terry doctrine which,
despite its many critics who echo Justice Frankfurter’s fear of arbitrary or discrimi-
natory enforcement,17 is now firmly established as settled doctrine.18 Indeed, the
Court’s enthusiasm for a warrant requirement has markedly waned; as Justice Scalia
later observed, “the ‘warrant requirement’ ha[s] become so riddled with exceptions
that it [i]s basically unrecognizable.”19 In the past few decades, although the Court
15 Id. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)).
16 Id. at 30.
17 See, e.g., Tovah Renee Calderón, Race-Based Policing from Terry to Wardlow: Steps
Down the Totalitarian Path, 44 HOW. L.J. 73, 85–94 (2000); I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking
the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 30–34 (2011); Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 946 (2002); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment
“Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1648–63 (1998); Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-
Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and
Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851, 852–54 (2002); Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five:
A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 485–97 (2004); Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with
Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133,
1150–57 (2012); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and
Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1276–79 (1998); Thomas B. McAffee,
Setting Us Up for Disaster: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Terry v. Ohio, 12 NEV. L.J.
609, 612–21 (2012); Thomas Regnier, The “Loyal Foot Soldier”: Can the Fourth Amendment
Survive the Supreme Court’s War on Drugs?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 631, 662–64 (2004); L.
Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035,
2059–72 (2011); Omar Saleem, The Age of Unreason: The Impact of Reasonableness,
Increased Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry “Stop and Frisk,” 50 OKLA. L. REV.
451, 482–88 (1997); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the
Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 983–98 (1999). For more sympathetic accounts
of Terry, see Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case against
Terry v. Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 346–56 (2010), and Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v.
Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911, 952–70 (1998).
18 See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185–89 (2004);
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–
28 (2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330–31 (1990); United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7 (1989); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227–29 (1985).
19 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). For a helpful
summary of the Court’s inconsistent allegiance to a warrant requirement, see, for example,
THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 466–
515 (2008), and 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 446–51, at § 4.1(b) (4th ed. 2004).
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has occasionally concerned itself with excessive police discretion,20 in the main,
efforts to circumscribe discretion have not been at the heart of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.21 Beyond that, curbing police discretion seems, at best, an incomplete
account of the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment. After all, official discre-
tion could be eliminated by a regime that searches everyone; yet that hardly seems
an attractive account of the constitutional prohibition on unreasonable search and
seizure.22 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has refused to make the absence of
discretion a safe harbor; the Court has generally condemned search and seizure un-
dertaken in such a dragnet fashion except in carefully confined circumstances in-
volving what the Court characterizes as a “special need” beyond the general interest
in law enforcement.23 Curbing official discretion may be an important means to
some larger end, but, in itself, it is an unlikely candidate for the central meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.
Beyond concern with official discretion, two other candidates for the central
meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s command of reasonableness have appeared.
The first is essentially libertarian in character; it understands the Fourth Amendment
as establishing a constitutional boundary of the government’s investigative powers.
On this view, the Fourth Amendment keeps society free by limiting the government’s
20 See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 322, 345 n.5 (2009); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653–54 (1979); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895–97 (1975).
21 See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850–57 (2006) (upholding searches of
parolees absent individualized decision over a claim of excessive discretion); Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 345–54 (2001) (rejecting a proposed rule limiting officers’
authority to make custodial arrests for nonjailable offenses); Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 810–19 (1996) (rejecting arguments that authority to arrest on probable cause should
be limited when officers act on a pretextual or otherwise unjustifiable basis). Indeed, in recent
years, even many advocates of a robust warrant requirement make their case in terms of ob-
jectives other than curbing official discretion. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking
Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1638–52 (2012) (arguing that warrants more
effectively promote compliance with the Fourth Amendment than ex post remedies for war-
rantless search and seizure).
22 Cf. Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 789 (1999) (“The
primary vice of the antidiscrimination model is its failure to provide a constitutional floor
protecting individuals and constraining government. If the political majority wants to reside
in a police state marked by absolute power to search and seize, the model poses no barrier
so long as the burden is shared by the entire community.”); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra
note 3, at 101 (asserting that tactics focused at particular segments of the community “might
reflect a sensible, non-prejudiced judgment that law enforcement gains would be achieved
at a lesser privacy cost by focusing the privacy loss on a smaller group of people. If th[is] . . .
judgment is correct, then it seems bizarre to insist, in the name of the fourth amendment, that
the government achieve its ends by imposing greater and unnecessary privacy losses”). Never-
theless, some argue that when search-and-seizure is broad-based, the political process can
generally be trusted to check abuse. This position is considered in Part II.E below.
23 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000); Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313–22 (1997).
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investigative reach. The second understands the Fourth Amendment in terms of free-
dom against unjustified government intrusion. It is therefore essentially pragmatic
in character, requiring an effort to balance liberty and law-enforcement interests.24
This Article inquires into these competing conceptions of Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness. Whatever the virtues of judicial minimalism, Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence has embraced fundamental principles to animate the constitutional conception
of reasonableness, but it has embraced different fundamental principles at different
times. Part I demonstrates that, at different times, the Supreme Court has embraced
fundamentally differing libertarian and pragmatic conceptions of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness; both conceptions have enjoyed periods of ascendance and decline,
and both continue to influence Fourth Amendment doctrine. This libertarian-pragmatic
divide is of increasing importance because, after a long period in which pragmatism
seemed triumphant, libertarianism has enjoyed an important resurgence. Indeed, the
debate between libertarianism and pragmatism has become central to contemporary
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
To be sure, in many cases, the Court’s failure to choose between the libertarian
and pragmatic conceptions of the Fourth Amendment is understandable; most cases
do not require such a choice. Often, both conceptions can be employed in support
of a given result, and in such cases, perhaps the minimalist virtues argue for a deci-
sion that can be supported by libertarians and pragmatists alike. Part II accordingly
focuses on the decision in Florida v. Jardines.25 Jardines involved police officers’
use of a narcotics-detection dog that alerted to the presence of contraband while on
the porch outside the front door to Jardines’s home.26 The use of a reliable narcotics-
detection dog can be characterized as a binary search—binary because it reveals no
more than whether there is probable cause to believe that an otherwise concealed
area contains contraband.27
24 Although prior scholarship has not dichotomized the competing conceptions of the
Fourth Amendment in precisely this way, the dichotomy proposed here is much like one
previously offered by Morgan Cloud, who distinguished between Fourth Amendment prag-
matism and what he calls “principled positivism,” which is much like the libertarian concep-
tion of the Fourth Amendment described above. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism,
and Principle in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 293–301 (1993). Thomas
Clancy has suggested a similar dichotomy by asking whether “the Fourth Amendment [is]
designed to regulate law enforcement practices or . . . to protect individuals from overreach-
ing governmental intrusions?” Thomas K. Clancy, The Purpose of the Fourth Amendment
and Crafting Rules to Implement That Purpose, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 479, 481 (2014). Also
along similar lines is a dichotomy offered by Jack Nowlin involving what he calls the “pro-
tected interests” and the “reasonable expectation of privacy” views of the Fourth Amendment.
See Jack Wade Nowlin, The Warren Court’s House Built on Sand: From Security in Persons,
Houses, Papers, and Effects to Mere Reasonableness in Fourth Amendment Doctrine, 81
MISS. L.J. 1017, 1031–41 (2012).
25 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
26 Id. at 1413.
27 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 8, at 415–17.
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In a true binary search, the competing conceptions of the Fourth Amendment
point toward different outcomes. On the libertarian conception, the Fourth Amend-
ment would regard as unreasonable granting the government effectively unlimited
power to scrutinize otherwise private space—accordingly depriving individuals of
any zone from which they are free from official scrutiny, at least absent adequate
predication. On the pragmatic conception, a binary search conducted that discloses
nothing more than the probable presence of contraband is supported by powerful
law-enforcement interests, and conducted in a manner unlikely to threaten any
legitimate liberty interest of the innocent, could readily be regarded as constitution-
ally reasonable even if unsupported by individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.
In Jardines, by a five-to-four vote, the Court embraced the libertarian conception.
Writing that “[a]t the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion,’”28
the Court held that “[t]he government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the
home and its immediate surroundings is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”29 Jardines’s libertarianism, however, is stunted and incomplete; the
Court’s holding can be readily circumvented by investigative techniques that stop
short of a physical intrusion, and might even leave binary searches unregulated if they
are ultimately deemed constitutionally reasonable, even if considered a “search.”
Thus, Jardines’s libertarianism offers little more to libertarians than pragmatists. This
should be unsurprising; Part II concludes that given our current understanding of the
scope of governmental regulatory power, the binary search demonstrates the absence
of a coherent justification for a libertarian conception of the Fourth Amendment.
Searches with no potential to compromise the interests of the innocent—such as a
true binary search—are constitutionally unobjectionable in a regime that recognizes
no legitimate interest in even the entirely “private” possession of items that the govern-
ment may deem unlawful to possess. Thus, the persistence of the libertarian concep-
tion comes with the inevitable cost of a loss of conceptual coherence. Moving beyond
the particulars of the binary search debate, Part II concludes that although the prag-
matic conception leaves plenty of room for debate over the proper scope of investiga-
tive authority, only the pragmatic conception has any real power to rationalize Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
I. THE COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has oscillated between two competing con-
ceptions of unreasonable search and seizure. The first is libertarian, having its roots
28 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961)).
29 Id. at 1417–18. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Breyer. Id. at 1420–26 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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in the seminal decision in Boyd v. United States.30 This view conceives of the Fourth
Amendment as granting freedom from government intrusion on what is regarded as
a protected zone of liberty, a principle originally derived from property law, but
which contemporary scholars, and some recent opinions of the Supreme Court, seek
to move beyond its property-law roots. The second is pragmatic in character, having
its origins in Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion elevating privacy over property-law
interests in Olmstead v. United States.31 This view regards the essence of the Fourth
Amendment as a right to be free from “unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual.”32 This conception broadens Fourth Amendment
protection beyond that recognized by the law of property but also narrows protection
by acknowledging that, on sufficient justification, the government may intrude even
on those interests traditionally protected by the law of property or otherwise.
A. Libertarianism as the Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment
The earliest cases in which the Supreme Court treated the Fourth Amendment
reflect a libertarian conception of reasonableness. This conception used the law of
property to demarcate both the zone of constitutionally protected interests and the
limits on investigative authority.
Boyd was “the first Supreme Court decision in which the [F]ourth [A]mendment
looms large.”33 Addressing the constitutionality of a customs statute authorizing a
court to order an importer to produce relevant business records in a proceeding seek-
ing the forfeiture of merchandise allegedly imported without payment of required
duties, the Court concluded that “a compulsory production of a man’s private papers
to establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution . . . because it is a material
ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose of search and seizure.”34 Consid-
ering whether the search and seizure effected by the compulsory production of busi-
ness records was constitutionally reasonable, the Court distinguished it from a “search
for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed
to avoid the payment thereof,” because “[i]n the one case, the government is entitled
to the possession of the property; in the other it is not.”35 Similarly, when search and
seizure is undertaken in order to inspect property subject to tax or tax records that
must be made available for inspection, to locate contraband or identify property
subject to seizure to satisfy a judgment, or to recover stolen goods, the government
30 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
31 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
32 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33 TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: SEARCH,
SEIZURE, AND SURVEILLANCE AND FREE TRIAL AND FAIR PRESS 53 (1969).
34 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622.
35 Id. at 623.
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or the creditor are intruding on no property rights, “[w]hereas, by the proceeding
now under consideration, the court attempts to extort from the party his private
books and papers.”36
Noting that the Fourth Amendment emerged from colonial grievances against the
use of general warrants and writs of assistance,37 the Court quoted extensively from
“Lord Camden’s memorable discussion of the subject”38 in Entick v. Carrington,39
in which Lord Camden opined that “every invasion of private property, be it ever
so minute, is a trespass,” and that
[p]apers are the owner’s goods and chattels; they are his dearest
property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will
hardly bear an inspection; and though the eye cannot by the laws
of England be guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are
removed and carried away the secret nature of those goods will
be an aggravation of the trespass.40
Writing that “[t]he principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security,” the Court concluded that “any forcible and com-
pulsory extortion of a man’s . . . private papers . . . is within the condemnation of
that judgment.”41
One potential implication of Boyd was that items to which the owner has a le-
gitimate right to possess under the law of property are immune from search or sei-
zure even on a warrant or other compelling justification. This implication became
a holding in Gouled v. United States.42 There, citing Boyd, the Court reasoned that
papers are subject to search and seizure
only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be
found in the interest which the public or the complainant may
have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the possession
of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders pos-
session of the property by the accused unlawful and provides
that it may be taken.43
36 Id. at 624.
37 Id. at 625–26.
38 Id. at 626.
39 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765).
40 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627, 627–28 (quoting Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
41 Id. at 630.
42 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
43 Id. at 309.
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Thus, according to Boyd, even a warrant could only authorize a search for and
seizure of contraband or stolen property.44 On that basis, the Court in Gouled held
that the seizure of business records for use as evidence in a fraud prosecution vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment because the government could assert no right in these
documents superior to that of their owners, even though they were seized pursuant
to warrants, the validity of which had gone unchallenged.45 It followed that papers
“of ‘evidential value only’” should not have been admitted in evidence.46
To the contemporary eye, used to the Court’s more recent expressions of concern
about the social costs of excluding probative evidence of guilt,47 what is perhaps most
striking about Boyd and Gouled is the Court’s lack of attention to the law-enforcement
interests compromised by the immunity it had recognized from search for and seizure
of probative evidence of guilt. This was the logical consequence of conceptualizing
the Fourth Amendment as identifying a set of protected interests on which the gov-
ernment may not intrude. To identify protected interests, Boyd and Gouled looked
to the law of property to define the limits of the government’s powers of search and
seizure.48 The right of an owner of property to enforce the trespass laws or otherwise
assert property interests, of course, is not dependent on the owner’s innocence, and
when Fourth Amendment law was tied to property-law conceptions, innocence played
naturally little role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.49 The result was to sharply
circumscribe the ability of the government to obtain and use probative evidence of
guilt; perhaps an alarming outcome to some contemporary eyes, but a logical conse-
quence of identifying the scope of protected liberty with the right of property owners
to exclude others. Indeed, when the Court announced an exclusionary rule prohibit-
ing the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in Weeks v.
United States,50 it invoked the right of the owner of property wrongfully seized to
demand its return.51
44 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623–24.
45 Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309–11.
46 Id. at 312–13.
47 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011); Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009); Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364–65
(1998); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984).
48 Gouled, 255 U.S. at 310; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627, 630.
49 For a helpful discussion on the relationship between this line of cases and traditional
property-law conceptions of trespass, see George C. Thomas III, Stumbling Toward History:
The Framers’ Search and Seizure World, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 199, 221–25 (2010). For a
somewhat different view, contending that the original understanding of search and seizure is
not so closely tied to technical conceptions of trespass, see Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History
of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 70–86.
50 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
51 Id. at 392–93, 398. As the Court later observed, “[t]he remedial structure at the time
even of Weeks v. United States . . . was arguably explainable in property terms.” Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (citation omitted); see also Morgan Cloud, The Fourth
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Although this understanding of the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment
produced something close to absolute protection for what were regarded as property
interests, the limits on property rights also defined the limits on Fourth Amendment
protection. For example, in Marron v. United States,52 the Court upheld, as a search
incident to arrest, the search of a tavern and the seizure of a ledger and bills because
any location used as an illegal tavern was declared “by the National Prohibition Act
to be a common nuisance,”53 and “[t]he authority of officers to search and seize the
things by which the nuisance was being maintained, extended to all parts of the prem-
ises used for the unlawful purpose” and to all items “used to carry it on.”54 Thus, just
as the law of nuisance limits the scope of property rights, it limited the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. Similarly, in Olmstead v. United States,55 the Court,
relying on the framing-era rule that only a physical trespass was thought to be an
unlawful invasion of the privacy of the home, held that wiretapping unaccompanied
by a physical trespass to the home was not a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.56 In short, expansive property-law protections led to expansive
Fourth Amendment protection, but the limitations on property-law rights led to con-
comitantly limited Fourth Amendment protection.
B. Pragmatic Balancing as the Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment
The libertarian regime’s effort to use property rights to define the limits of gov-
ernmental search-and-seizure power proved problematic for a number of reasons.
First, there was a textual problem. The Fourth Amendment does not protect
“property,” but rather “persons, houses, papers, and effects” against “unreasonable
search and seizure.”57 This textual formulation, of course, does not track those in-
terests protected by the law of property. For example, the Court held that a trespass
onto an “open field” did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it did not com-
promise any of the interests identified as protected in the Fourth Amendment’s text.58
Beyond that, as we have seen, Boyd acknowledged that even a trespass to the home
could be justified by a warrant authorizing a search for and seizure of contraband or
Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory,
48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 587–92 (1996); William C. Heffernan, On Justifying Fourth Amend-
ment Exclusion, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1193, 1220–29; Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution:
The Original System of Remedies, How It Changed, and How the Court Responded, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 169–73 (2012); Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 50–52 (2009).
52 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
53 Id. at 198.
54 Id. at 199.
55 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
56 Id. at 465–66.
57 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
58 See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
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stolen or forfeitable property.59 Warrantless search and seizure of automobiles were
subsequently permitted on the basis of probable cause to believe that they obtained
contraband on the theory that the moveable character of the property made an im-
mediate search imperative.60 In these cases, law enforcement interests were thought
to justify a limitation on the right of the owner of property to exclude others. If suf-
ficiently weighty law-enforcement interests could limit the rights of property owners,
however, then the law of property failed to provide an adequate measure of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness.
Second, the Court came to conclude that protection of Fourth Amendment rights
required protection even for those who asserted no property rights in the items seized
by the authorities. On this point, push came to shove in Agnello v. United States,61
in which the Court rejected an argument that an accused could not seek suppression
of cocaine recovered as the result of an unconstitutional search and seizure because
a rule that required the accused to acknowledge ownership of contraband in order
to vindicate his Fourth Amendment rights would effectively require him to incrimi-
nate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.62 Thus, the Court acknowledged
the difficulties with making Fourth Amendment rights turn on an assertion of prop-
erty rights.
Third, the Court came to see that property-law rules developed to regulate the
relations of private parties were often a poor fit when applied to search and seizure.
For example, the Court came to hold that despite a landlord’s property-law right to
enter leased property, a landlord’s consent to a search of a leased residence would
not sustain a search under the Fourth Amendment.63 The Court similarly held that
a hotel proprietor’s state-law right to enter leased rooms did not mean that the
proprietor’s consent to a police search of a guest’s room could validate an otherwise
unreasonable search.64 Similarly, the Court held that a guest lawfully on the searched
premises but having no property interest in those premises could nevertheless
complain of an allegedly unlawful search and seizure.65 Thus, the Court came to
regard some interests left unprotected by the law of property as worthy of Fourth
Amendment protection.
It was this final point that proved fatal to the libertarian regime of Boyd and its
progeny. Olmstead’s holding that nontrespassory wiretapping was not a “search” or
“seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment provoked Justice Brandeis’s
famous dissenting opinion, in which he wrote that “[c]lauses guaranteeing to the
59 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
60 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–59 (1925).
61 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
62 Id. at 34–35.
63 See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616–17 (1961).
64 See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 487–90 (1964).
65 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265–67 (1960), overruled by United States
v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
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individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity
of adaptation to a changing world.”66 Since the framing era, Justice Brandeis argued,
“[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available
to the Government.”67 In particular, “[w]henever a telephone line is tapped, the pri-
vacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded. . . . As a means of espionage,
writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and
oppression when compared with wire-tapping.”68 Justice Brandeis contended that
“every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”69 This view became law when, in Katz v. United States,70 the Court famously
wrote that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”71 and on that basis
repudiated Olmstead and held that wiretapping fell within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment even if it involved no trespass to a home.72 The Court went on to hold
that the warrantless wiretapping in that case amounted to an unreasonable search and
seizure because it had not been authorized by a warrant.73
The triumph of Justice Brandeis’s view that all invasions of privacy require ap-
propriate justification meant that search-and-seizure authority would have to be tied
to an appropriate law-enforcement justification rather than property-law conceptions.
The revolution that this approach produced in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was
not limited to wiretapping. For example, the new regime revolutionized the law of
search incident to arrest. In Marron, as we have seen, the Court held that it is consti-
tutionally reasonable to search incident to an arrest all premises used to carry on an
unlawful nuisance, relying on the limitations that the law of nuisance places on prop-
erty rights.74 Once, however, the justification to search was based not on the lack of
a property right to prevent the search but on the law-enforcement justification for
the search, the Marron doctrine could not stand. The Court subsequently held that
because the pragmatic rationale for a search incident to arrest was to protect the
arresting officer’s safety, the search must be limited to the grabbable area within the
arrestee’s immediate control.75
Viewed through the lens of pragmatism, the obvious objection to expanding the
Fourth Amendment is that constraining the ability of authority to search for and
66 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 473.
68 Id. at 475–76.
69 Id. at 478.
70 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
71 Id. at 351.
72 Id. at 352–53.
73 Id. at 354–59.
74 See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
75 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–68 (1969); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 322, 343 (2009) (applying this rule to searches of vehicles incident to an arrest).
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seize evidence of a crime has the undesirable consequence of inhibiting the appre-
hension of the guilty. There is, however, a pragmatic answer to be found in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence—constraining search-and-seizure authority protects the
innocent against overzealous officials. The Court came to justify the exclusionary rule,
for example, based on its ability to deter official misconduct.76 Similarly, the Court
has reasoned that the virtue of a warrant requirement is that it ensures that the deci-
sion to undertake a search is made “by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime . . . leav[ing] the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police
officers.”77 Justice Frankfurter made this very point in support of his conception of
the Fourth Amendment as a limitation on enforcement discretion in United States v.
Rabinowitz, writing that the Fourth Amendment “subordinate[s] police action to legal
restraints, not in order to convenience the guilty but to protect the innocent.”78 Thus,
the concern in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with official discretion may ulti-
mately rest on a pragmatic rationale for protecting the innocent against the poten-
tially overzealous officer. Indeed, a number of legal scholars have argued that a
central concern of contemporary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is with protect-
ing the innocent.79
Yet, protection of the innocent against unjustified search and seizure is an in-
complete account of the change wrought by the demise of the libertarian regime of
Boyd and its progeny. After all, if the objective of the Fourth Amendment were
merely to protect the innocent against unjustified search and seizure, it would have
banned search and seizure altogether. The innocent, however, require more than
protection against official scrutiny; they also require protection against lawbreakers.
Hence, any complete account of reasonableness, at least on the pragmatic concep-
tion, must take account of law enforcement interests as well.
Indeed, Justice Brandeis’s view that the Fourth Amendment prohibited “unjusti-
fiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual”80 implied
76 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426–27 (2011); Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 141–42 (2009); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485–86 (1976).
77 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (citation omitted); accord, e.g.,
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212–13 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
585–86 (1980); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 316–17
(1972); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948).
78 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
79 See, e.g., L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-
Abiding Persons, 99 GEO. L.J. 1517, 1533–48 (2011); Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy,
and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1476–502
(1996); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1244–48 (1983); Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth
Amendment Enforcement, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1491–93.
80 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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that upon what is regarded as sufficient justification, intrusions on privacy should
be regarded as constitutionally reasonable. That implication had already been real-
ized by the time of Katz v. United States; earlier that term in Warden v. Hayden,81
the Court had rejected Gouled’s rule that the Fourth Amendment permitted the
seizure of fruits or instrumentalities of crime but not “mere evidence.”82 The Court
reasoned that “the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of
privacy rather than property.”83 The Court added: “The requirement that the Govern-
ment assert in addition some property interest in material it seizes has long been a
fiction, obscuring the reality that government has an interest in solving crime.”84
Subsequently, the Court also rejected the view that using an accused’s papers recov-
ered in the course of a search and seizure as evidence against him violated the Fifth
Amendment’s prohibition on compulsory self-incrimination on the ground that a sei-
zure of private papers by the authorities does not compel the accused to become a wit-
ness against himself.85 Accordingly, the new regime rejected the view that there was
a truly private realm free from the threat of official scrutiny regardless of the strength
of the government’s proffered justification for a contested search or seizure.86
Thus, a regime focused on unwarranted invasion of privacy would not be a slave
to property-law conceptions, but it would also accommodate the law-enforcement
interests. This view accordingly narrowed Fourth Amendment protections when
compared to the libertarian conception in the face of sufficiently compelling govern-
mental interests. Indeed, as we have seen, not long after Katz, the Terry doctrine
emerged to authorize a stop-and-frisk when an officer reasonably suspects that a sus-
pect is engaged in crime and could be dangerous.87 Terry is a classic example of the
pragmatic conception of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, cautioning that “there
is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.”88 Other
cases have applied the concept of unjustified intrusion to seizures of property in
81 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
82 Id. at 300.
83 Id. at 304.
84 Id. at 306 (footnote omitted). Thus, Hayden paved the way for Katz, as the Court
acknowledged when it wrote, “[t]he premise that property interests control the right of the
Government to search and seize has been discredited.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (quoting
Hayden, 387 U.S. at 304) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85 See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470–77 (1976).
86 For useful discussion on the import of Hayden for a libertarian conception of the
Fourth Amendment, see Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided: How the Warren Court
Dismantled the Fourth Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33, 55–64 (2005), and Nowlin,
supra note 24, at 1063–75.
87 See supra text accompanying notes 14–16.
88 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S.
523, 536–37 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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which possessory rather than liberty or privacy interests are at stake.89 Utilizing a
balancing of protected privacy, liberty, or possessory interests against law enforce-
ment justifications for a challenged search or seizure, the Court has even, on what
it regarded as sufficient justification, dispensed with the traditional probable-cause
and warrant requirements.90 In fashioning this doctrine, the protection of the inno-
cent has not been the only relevant consideration; the Court has made plain that the
Terry standard “falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard,”91 and “accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people.”92
Thus, as some commentators have observed, the emergence of the Katz conception
of the Fourth Amendment cannot properly be characterized as libertarian.93 Instead,
as we have seen, this era represents the triumph of pragmatic balancing as the central
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.94
Accordingly, the pragmatic conception of the Fourth Amendment as directed at
unjustified intrusions is not concerned only with protecting the innocent, but rather
with balancing the intrusion on protected interests—including the interests of the
innocent—against law-enforcement interests. As perhaps the leading criminal pro-
cedure scholar of recent decades writing in the pragmatic tradition, the late William
Stuntz, once put it, the task of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, on the pragmatic
account, is to “bring the Fourth Amendment’s balance closer to the true balance of
social costs and social benefits that attend different sorts of police work.”95
89 See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61–64, 71 (1992).
90 See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (search of parolees); Illinois v.
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (checkpoint seeking information about prior hit-and-run); Bd.
of Educ. of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. Ninety-Two v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (drug testing of
students engaged in extracurricular activities); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoint); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989) (drug testing of federal employees engaged in drug interdiction or carrying firearms);
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (detention at border of indi-
vidual suspected of alimentary canal smuggling); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
(search of purse of student suspected of possessing cigarettes); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (immigration checkpoint near the border).
91 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002).
92 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000).
93 See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Pro-
cedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 36–43 (2010).
94 For useful discussions of this understanding of the implications of Katz, see CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 21–47 (2007), and Nowlin, supra note 24, at 1039–41.
95 William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amend-
ment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 853 (2001); see also, e.g., Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum
Game: How to Increase the Productivity of the Fourth Amendment, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 549, 554–64 (2013); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L.
REV. 1511, 1527–33 (2010).
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C. The Persistence of Libertarianism in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The apparent triumph of Justice Brandeis’s pragmatism in Katz proved not to mark
the end of a libertarian conception that tied Fourth Amendment protections to the prop-
erty owner’s right to exclude others. After all, it is easy to understand the objections to
pragmatic balancing; many have argued that balancing tests are likely to systematically
undervalue liberty interests in favor of more tangible law-enforcement objectives.96
Beyond that, as we have seen, prior to Katz, there was a long tradition that under-
stood the Fourth Amendment concept of reasonableness as embodying a limitation
on the reach of investigative authority, regardless of law-enforcement justifications.
Given the power of the libertarian conception, it may be unsurprising that it con-
tinued to influence Fourth Amendment jurisprudence even after Katz. For example,
as it held that the Fourth Amendment does not regulate the inspection of garbage left
for collection on a public curb or street, the Court stressed that such material is ac-
cessible not only to garbage collectors but to any other member of the public.97 Sim-
ilarly, as it held that an aerial inspection of a fenced backyard did not infringe on a
reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court stressed that members of the public had
the right to overfly the yard from navigable airspace and view what lies below.98 In
96 See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 24, at 242–47; Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment
in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis,
63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1187–93 (1988). For what is perhaps the canonical attack on bal-
ancing in constitutional law, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 972–1004 (1987). Some have also criticized Fourth Amendment
balancing in particular as unacceptably indeterminate. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 17, at 1149–
50; Gerald S. Reamey, When “Special Needs” Meet Probable Cause: Denying the Devil
Benefit of Law, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 299–300, 327 (1992); Carol S. Steiker,
Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 855 (1994). This objection
is more easily answered. Fourth Amendment pragmatism need not produce mere ad hoc
decisionmaking; there are powerful pragmatic arguments for bright-line rules that provide
necessary doctrinal predictability. Cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001)
(“[W]e have traditionally recognized that a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not
well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government
need . . . . Often enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat)
of the moment, and the object in implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw
standards sufficiently clear and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial
second-guessing months and years after an arrest or search is made.” (citation omitted)).
97 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
98 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–14 (1986). This holding was subsequently
extended to an overflight at four-hundred feet by a helicopter operating at a lower altitude
than is permitted for fixed-wing aircraft, with four Justices stressing that the overflight was
lawful under applicable laws and regulations and therefore infringed no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–52 (1989) (plurality opinion). Justice
O’Connor concurred in the result, but her agreement was based on her view that the defen-
dant had not established that overflights at this altitude are sufficiently rare to establish a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 454–55 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Smith v. Maryland,99 the Court held that there is no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in records of the telephone numbers dialed from a subscriber’s home phone,
reasoning that the information at issue was customarily retained in the telephone
company’s business records, bringing the case within the rule that “a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.”100 The Court relied on its earlier decision in United States v. Miller,101 in
which the Court held that a subpoena calling for the production of bank records of
a depositor’s financial records infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy of the
depositor because the depositor “can assert neither ownership nor possession” over
the records,102 and they contained only information that the depositor had voluntarily
disclosed to the bank and about which federal law requires records to be maintained and
made available by subpoena to law enforcement.103 Indeed, the Court has acknowl-
edged that Katz did not inter entirely the property-based libertarian regime: “[B]y
focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
the Court has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determining the
presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.”104
The Court’s refusal to read Katz as requiring constitutional protections over this
swath of activities and information ordinarily shielded from public scrutiny has pro-
voked enormous criticism from legal commentators who deride what they regard as
Katz’s failure to provide principled and coherent Fourth Amendment protection for
privacy interests.105 Yet, it is far from clear that the problem is Katz, or instead the
failure of Katz to displace entirely the property-based libertarian conception of the
Fourth Amendment that dates to the era of Boyd and Gouled.
In any event, although the property-based conception has often been used to
reject Fourth Amendment claims, it has also operated to sustain such claims beyond
that offered by Katz itself. For example, in Alderman v. United States,106 the Court
held that the homeowner may challenge the government’s use of a recording of a
99 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
100 Id. at 743–44.
101 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
102 Id. at 440.
103 Id. at 442–43.
104 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
105 See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 94, at 151–64; Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth
Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1313–17
(1981); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 126–59 (2002); Lewis R. Katz,
In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 565–69
(1990); Loewy, supra note 79, at 1254–56; Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy,
54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 828–31 (2005); Solove, supra note 95, at 1536–38; Scott E.
Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government
and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1757–58 (1994).
106 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
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conversation that was intercepted as a result of an unlawful entry for purposes of
placing a listening device in his home even if the homeowner was not a participant
in the conversation because “[t]he rights of the owner of the premises are as clearly
invaded when the police enter and install a listening device . . . as they are when the
entry is made to undertake a warrantless search for tangible property.”107 Thus, it was
the owner’s property right to exclude others from his home, not his interest in the
privacy of his conversations, that sustained the owner’s Fourth Amendment claim.108
The persistence of the libertarian conception has become even clearer in a series
of opinions written by Justice Scalia, beginning with Kyllo v. United States.109 In
that case, the Court addressed the question whether the use of a thermal imaging de-
vice positioned on public property outside of a home that discloses “the relative heat
of various rooms in the home,”110 amounts to a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.111 For the dissenters, thermal imaging did not implicate the
Fourth Amendment under Katz and its progeny because homeowners have no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the manner in which heat is emitted from a resi-
dence.112 The Court, in contrast, acknowledged that “[t]he Katz test . . . has often been
criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable,”113 and then reasoned:
While it may be difficult to refine Katz when the search of areas
such as telephone booths, automobiles, or even the curtilage and
uncovered portions of residences is at issue, in the case of the
search of the interior of homes—the prototypical and hence most
commonly litigated area of protected privacy—there is a ready
criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal ex-
pectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be
reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation
would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaran-
teed by the Fourth Amendment. We think that obtaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the
107 Id. at 179–80.
108 The Court later explained that, despite Katz, it “ha[d] not altogether abandoned use of
property concepts in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected
by that Amendment,” adding that “[n]o better demonstration of this proposition exists than
the decision in Alderman.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12. For a helpful discussion of the per-
sistence of property-law concepts in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see Orin S. Kerr, The
Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution,
102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809–27 (2004).
109 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
110 Id. at 35 n.2.
111 Id. at 31–33.
112 Id. at 41–44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 34 (majority opinion).
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home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physi-
cal intrusion into a constitutionally protected area . . . constitutes
a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is
not in general public use.114
Based on this understanding, the Court held that the use of the thermal imager
amounted to the “search” of a house that had not been authorized by a warrant and
therefore violated the Fourth Amendment.115 It did not matter that the thermal
imager disclosed only limited information about the pattern by which heat was
emitted from the home since “[i]n the home . . . all details are intimate details,
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”116 Thus, for the
Kyllo majority, any effort to learn about the interior of a residence otherwise con-
cealed from public view is subject to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
It seems that under Kyllo, we need not worry about the Brandeisian concept of an
“unjustifiable invasion of privacy”; anything that discloses what occurs while se-
cluded from public view within a home or other protected area, even through the use
of an investigative technique that is nonintrusive and supported by compelling law-
enforcement interests, is nevertheless subject to the Fourth Amendment’s require-
ment of a warrant supported by probable cause. This is surely libertarianism, not
pragmatism.117 Unsurprisingly, commentators critical of Katz and its progeny have
celebrated Kyllo, regarding it as rejecting an approach that provides only uncertain
constitutional protection for a plainer boundary that treats the acquisition of any
information that is concealed from public view within a residence or similarly pri-
vate domain as a search subject to the commands of the Fourth Amendment.118
Subsequently, in United States v. Jones,119 in another opinion by Justice Scalia,
the Court held that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle and its subsequent use to
114 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115 Id. at 40.
116 Id. at 37.
117 Cf. Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology,
75 MISS. L.J. 1, 28–32 (2005) (contending that cases evaluating the application of the Fourth
Amendment to new technologies through Kyllo continue to afford Fourth Amendment pro-
tection to particular kinds of spaces rather than by assessing personal privacy); Nowlin, supra
note 24, at 1041–46 (arguing that Kyllo focuses on places that are protected by the Fourth
Amendment rather than reasonable expectations of privacy).
118 See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court,
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 41–48 (2002); Colb, supra note 105,
at 166–70; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the
Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1362–67 (2002); Tracey Maclin,
Kyllo, Katz, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First
Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 61–72 (2002); Nowlin, supra note 24, at 1045–46; David A. Sklansky,
Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 178–88 (2002).
119 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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monitor the movements of a vehicle was a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.120 Quoting Entick’s statement that “no man can set his foot upon his
neighbor’s close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser,”121 the Court rea-
soned that to “[assure] preservation of that degree of privacy against government
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted,”122 the Fourth Amendment
should be “understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon
the areas (persons, houses, papers, and effects) it enumerates.”123 Thus, the Court
held that in addition to the approach taken in Katz for nontrespassory investigative
techniques, a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs when
there is a “[t]respass . . . conjoined with that what was present here: an attempt to
find something or to obtain information.”124
Thus, despite the rise of Katz and the seeming triumph of Justice Brandeis’s
Olmstead dissent, libertarianism is alive and well in Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. Indeed, many of the critics of Katz who, although not advocating a return to
the property-based regime of Boyd and its progeny and differing in many details,
nevertheless share the belief that the central objective of the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence should be to identify the limits of government power as a means of
protecting individual liberty.125 Perhaps Morgan Cloud has best articulated this view:
The text and history of the Fourth Amendment demonstrate that
it exists to enhance individual liberty by constraining government
120 Id. at 954.
121 Id. at 949 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765)).
122 Id. at 950 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 29, 34 (2001)).
123 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
124 Id. at 951 n.5. To be sure, four additional Members of the Court advocated a more
pragmatic conception demanding constitutional regulation when GPS surveillance is of un-
usually long duration because this technological advance makes intrusive investigations so
much less resource-intensive, id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment), and a fifth
Member of the Court expressed considerable sympathy with these concerns, id. at 956–57
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
125 See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 12–15, 121–22 (2012); Amsterdam, supra
note 3, at 402–09; Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth Amend-
ment’s Principled Protection of Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 620–37 (2008); Timothy
Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the Right to Be Secure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 977,
1025–31 (2008); Castiglione, supra note 2, at 674–75; Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the
Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307,
350–66 (1998) [hereinafter Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect]; Cloud,
supra note 51, at 616–28; Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH.
U. L. REV. 303, 350–54 (2010); Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons
from the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1210–26
(2009); Christian M. Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz: A Tale of Cognitive Freedom
and the Property of Personhood as Fourth Amendment Norm, 42 AKRON L. REV. 803,
860–66 (2009); Luna, supra note 22, at 829–61.
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power. The Amendment operates in a concrete dimension, regu-
lating the power of government to intrude physically upon peo-
ple and their property. But it also operates in a more abstract
dimension: The limitations it imposes on government are not
narrow and technical, but rest upon a sweeping vision of privacy
and autonomy. The Fourth Amendment enacts a vision of the
individual as an autonomous agent, empowered to act and be-
lieve and express himself free from government interference.126
Thus, both the libertarian and pragmatic conceptions of the Fourth Amendment
seem to be alive and well in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and scholarship.
D. History and the Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment
As we have seen, Justice Frankfurter believed that inquiry into the historical ori-
gins of the Fourth Amendment was central to apprehending its central meaning.127
Reliance on framing-era understandings is a longstanding staple of Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.128 In recent years, it has become commonplace; the Court now
tells us that “[i]n determining whether a search or seizure is unreasonable, we begin
with history. We look to the statutes and common law of the founding era to deter-
mine the norms that the Fourth Amendment was meant to preserve.”129 Thus, one
logical source for evidence of the Fourth Amendment’s central meaning is the orig-
inal understanding of the Fourth Amendment.
Yet, there is little that helps to identify its central meaning in the historical evi-
dence regarding the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment. Its drafting
history, for example, is unenlightening. The original proposal for what became the
Fourth Amendment was a single clause forbidding unreasonable search and seizure
“by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not
126 Cloud, supra note 51, at 618–19 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
127 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418–21 (1976); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 150–51 (1925); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–32 (1886),
rejected by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
129 Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008); accord, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001); Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999); Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995). For
helpful discussions of the importance of framing-era practice to Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence in recent decades, see Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order
Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in
Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 252–66 (2002), and David A. Sklansky,
The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1746–61 (2000).
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particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be
seized.”130 The text was changed during debate in the House to create a freestanding
clause prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure, but no explanation was offered
for the alteration, which led Professor Davies to conclude that the alteration was
intended only to phrase a prohibition on general warrants in a more imperative
fashion.131 That surmise may be a correct account of matter of congressional intent,
but the Supreme Court has cautioned,
[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as dis-
tinguished from technical meaning. Normal meaning may of
course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or
technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary
citizens in the founding generation.132
Accordingly, even if no one in the House intended a substantive change from Mad-
ison’s original formulation, this likely has little interpretive significance in determin-
ing how the public would have understood the proposal, at least absent evidence that
the public was aware of a congressional intent to preserve the substance of the origi-
nal proposal in a two-clause format. In fact, there is virtually no surviving evidence that
sheds any light on the understanding of the Fourth Amendment in the ratifying states.133
Thus, we must look for evidence of the ordinary framing-era semantic meaning
of “unreasonable search and seizure,” but it proves little more enlightening. David
Sklansky, for example, believes that in the framing era this phrase meant “what it
means today: contrary to sound judgment, inappropriate, or excessive.”134 Thomas
Davies, for his part, has contended that the term “unreasonable,” as a legal concept,
was understood to mean illegal or unconstitutional.135 Either view reduces the orig-
inal meaning of the Fourth Amendment to little more than a legal conclusion with-
out enlightening us as to the methodology to be used to reach that conclusion.
There is nevertheless a historical case to be made for the libertarian conception.
One point of agreement among legal scholars and historians is that the Fourth
130 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 223
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
131 See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 716–24 (1999).
132 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008) (quoting United States v.
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133 See WILLIAM JOHN CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL
MEANING, 602–1791, at 712–23 (1990).
134 See Sklansky, supra note 129, at 1777–81. He adds that the term was neither a widely
used concept nor a familiar term of art in the framing era. See id. at 1776–807.
135 See Davies, supra note 131, at 684–93.
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Amendment was originally understood to prohibit general warrants and their like.136
Even a warrant could authorize entry of a home only for purposes of searching for
and seizing stolen property or contraband.137 The evidence from the framing era so
overwhelmingly focuses on concerns over wrongful warrants authorizing intrusion
on the home that some have even argued that the historical evidence suggests that
the Fourth Amendment regulates only the issuance of warrants138 or the searches of
the home.139 Others are more impressed with historical evidence suggesting a more
general hostility to any form of broad search-and-seizure authority.140 In any event,
as Professor Davies has demonstrated, the framing-era focus on general warrants
must be understood against the background of a framing-era law regime that had noth-
ing resembling a modern police force vested with general investigative authority;
instead, in the framing era, officers had only meager authority to engage in warrant-
less search and seizure and a limited power of arrest.141 Moreover, if a jury concluded
that officers acting without a valid warrant exceeded their authority, they were per-
sonally liable in tort.142 
When the framing-era limitations on warrants are coupled with the limited au-
thority granted to officers acting without warrants, the framing-era conception seems
to offer support for a libertarian conception that understands the function of the
Fourth Amendment as limiting the investigative power of the government rather
than engaging in pragmatic balancing. Indeed, even the rhetoric of the historical
Fourth Amendment resonates with libertarianism, such as “the ancient adage that a
man’s house is his castle [to the point that the] poorest man may in his cottage bid
defiance to all the forces of the Crown.”143 It is therefore unsurprising that those who
136 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 3, at 10–17; CUDDIHY, supra note 133, at 770–72;
SCHULHOFER, supra note 125, at 22–34; TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 29–44; Clancy, supra
note 3, at 978–90; Davies, supra note 131, at 600–19; Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth
Amendment’s Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1392–94 (1989).
137 See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 133, at 487, 555, 633; Davies, supra note 131, at 645–
54; Roots, supra note 51, at 36–37.
138 See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38
DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 833–55 (1989).
139 See, e.g., David E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1061–73 (2004).
140 See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 133, at 773–82; Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’
Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1052–61 (2011);
William Cuddihy, Warrantless House-to-House Searches and Fourth Amendment Originalism:
A Reply to Professor Davies, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 997 (2012); Tracey Maclin, The Complexity
of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 939–59 (1997).
141 See Davies, supra note 131, at 573 n.56, 576–83, 619–68.
142 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 3, at 11–17, 20–21; CUDDIHY, supra note 133, at 593–96,
760–61; Davies, supra note 131, at 621–22, 665–66; Thomas, supra note 49, at 221–22,
225–26, 227–28.
143 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006) (quoting Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301, 307 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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embrace reliance on history to animate Fourth Amendment jurisprudence frequently
embrace a libertarian conception that regards the Fourth Amendment as a limitation
on governmental power rather than a pragmatic balance between liberty and order.144
This likely explains why Justice Scalia is an exponent of the libertarian conception;
he has embraced historical inquiry into the framing-era meaning of constitutional
text as the basis for constitutional interpretation.145
Some scholars argue that history supports a more pragmatic conception. Akhil
Amar, for example, has argued that the framing-era search-and-seizure law endorsed
a more flexible and pragmatic test of reasonableness.146 As framing-era support for
this view, he cites statutes in which Congress authorized suspicionless searches of
ships and liquor storehouses.147 These statutes suggest a more pragmatic balancing
of liberty and law-enforcement interests than would be suggested by an invariable
requirement of a warrant issued on probable cause. But, as Professor Davies has
noted, there is no framing-era source that endorses a general test of reasonableness
for search and seizure.148 He has also questioned the probative value of the statutes
authorizing searches of vessels and storehouses without a warrant or probable cause,
arguing these statutory precedents may well be attributable to the framing era’s in-
dulgent attitude toward revenue-related searches of commercial premises.149 Tracey
144 See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment as a Collective Right, 43 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 255, 256–60 (2010); Crocker, supra note 125, at 345–50; Ku, supra note 118,
at 1333–40; M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief
that Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 919–31 (2010); Regnier, supra note 17, at 632–43;
George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison Sees the
Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1463–78 (2005).
145 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 78–92 (2012); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 849, 862–64 (1989).
146 See AMAR, supra note 3, at 31–40; Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1108–10, 1118–20 (1998) [hereinafter Amar,
Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles].
147 See AMAR, supra note 3, at 18; Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles,
supra note 146, at 1104–05.
148 See Davies, supra note 131, at 591–600. Professor Amar highlighted a reference to
reasonableness in a seminal framing-era English case. See AMAR, supra note 3, at 13–14,
186 n.67. But, as Professor Davies observed, the statement says no more than that search and
seizure must be reasonable in duration and adds that if the search was unsupported by “prob-
able cause of suspicion,” a search’s limited duration does not establish its lawfulness. See
Davies, supra note 131, at 593–94. Telford Taylor has argued that the framing-era evidence
supports a general test of reasonableness, but his evidence consists only of the rule permitting
a search of an arrestee’s person incident to arrest. See TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 27–30, 43.
149 See Davies, supra note 131, at 604–08, 711–14; see also Thomas, supra note 144,
at 1477–78. Beyond that, Professor Davies has argued that the Fourth Amendment was not
thought applicable to matters falling within admiralty jurisdiction, noting that the amendment
did not mention vessels, but instead regulated searches of “houses, papers, and effects.”
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Maclin has explained these framing-era precedents by noting that searches of vessels
had always been regarded as governed by the special standards of admiralty law, and
the liquor-search statute provided only a highly limited authorization for premises
likely to contain taxable alcohol.150 Still, these precedents suggest that the framing-
era understanding permitted at least some relaxation of search-and-seizure restric-
tions to meet the felt exigencies of law enforcement.
In addition to the framing-era statutes that seem to accept pragmatic justifications
for broad search-and-seizure authority, there is additional evidence that framing-era
limitations on search-and-seizure powers reflect pragmatic considerations. William
Cuddihy and Arnold Loewy, for example, have noted that the framing-era criticism
of general warrants included the charge that they authorized unjustified searches.151
Indeed, the seminal case of Entick v. Carrington, on which Boyd so heavily relied,152
cautioned that permitting a general search for evidence would mean that “the innocent
would be confounded with the guilty.”153 Justice Frankfurter understood the framing-
era attacks on official discretion as reflecting a pragmatic concern that overzealous
officers would exercise that discretion in a manner that would lead to unjustified
search and seizure.154 Accordingly, the framing-era suspicion of excessive search-and-
seizure authority conferred by general warrants or otherwise can be understood not as
libertarianism, but rather as based on a concern about the threat of unjustified search
and seizure—the same consideration that animated Justice Brandeis’s pragmatism.
Perhaps most importantly, however, even if framing-era understandings tilt to-
ward the libertarian conception, that conception was not codified in the text of the
Fourth Amendment, and accordingly it is not clear why this understanding should
Davies, supra note 131, at 607–08. Whatever its merits, however, Professor Davies’s argu-
ment about the textual inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment to vessels does not account
for the framing-era willingness to permit warrantless searches of warehouses containing
“effects” that presumably fell within the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. On this
point, Professor Davies writes: “The most likely explanation for . . . the virtual silence
regarding searches of commercial premises, is that the Framers understood that legislative
authority for official inspection of commercial premises did not violate any common-law
principle comparable to the castle doctrine applicable to houses.” Id. at 608.
150 See Maclin, supra note 140, at 950–54; see also CUDDIHY, supra note 133, at 743–46;
Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1299–303 (2010);
Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707,
1739–43 (1996).
151 See CUDDIHY, supra note 133, at 460; Loewy, supra note 79, at 1237–40. Similarly,
Donald Dripps has argued that framing-era hostility to search and seizure of papers was rooted
in a concern that such searches inevitably required rummaging through innocent papers in
order to locate those that were incriminating. See Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”:
Digital Evidence and the History of Private “Papers” as Special Objects of Search and
Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 106–09 (2013).
152 See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.
153 Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1073 (C.P. 1765).
154 See supra notes 10–11, 77–79 and accompanying text.
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be regarded as interpretively binding. There is, moreover, reason to doubt whether
the framers’ assessment of reasonableness sheds much light on what is properly
regarded as constitutionally reasonable today.
Consider Kyllo.155 As we have seen, the Court rejected what it characterized as
the framing-era rule requiring a physical trespass to constitute an invasion of a le-
gally protected interest in the privacy of the home to prevent what it regarded as an
erosion of constitutional protection as a consequence of technological advances.156
The Court proffered a historical justification for its approach, writing that its ap-
proach “assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that ex-
isted when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”157 On this view, one could argue
that framing-era protections are the proper baseline to measure Fourth Amendment
protections. In this vein, Orin Kerr has argued that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
reflects an effort to maintain equilibrium by adjusting doctrine to ensure that changes
in technology or other circumstances do not alter the balance between liberty and
investigative power.158 Yet, Kyllo protects a privacy interest of far lesser dimension
than any regarded as protected in framing-era law. In the framing era, a physical
trespass for the purpose of gathering evidence necessarily enabled the trespasser—
by physically entering the home—to learn a great deal more than can be revealed
through a thermal image or similarly noninvasive technique. Even if one agrees with
Kyllo, it is hard to dispute Justice Stevens’s claim in his dissenting opinion that
“[t]he interest in concealing the heat escaping from one’s house pales in significance
to ‘the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed,’
the ‘physical entry of the home.’”159 Similarly, then-Professor Posner was surely
correct when he observed that electronic surveillance lacks critical elements of what
was regarded as an unreasonable search and seizure in the framing era because a
search and seizure involving a physical intrusion into the home presents elements of
force and coercion absent in electronic surveillance, of which the targets are usually
unaware.160 One can do little more than speculate about whether framing-era law
would have protected a privacy interest as limited as the one at issue in Kyllo.
The same quandary emerges in United States v. Jones where, as we have seen,
the Court invoked framing-era conceptions of trespass to support its holding.161 It
155 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
156 See supra text accompanying notes 109–18.
157 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
158 See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 480–81 (2011). For a similar view that focuses on maintaining an
equilibrium in terms of police efficiency in ferreting out crime, see Paul Ohm, The Fourth
Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1345–47 (2012).
159 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist.
Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
160 See Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court,
1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 185–88.
161 See 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); supra text accompanying notes 119–24.
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is doubtful that we can fairly equate the attachment and monitoring of a GPS device
to anything that arose in the framing era; as Justice Alito noted in his separate
opinion, “it is almost impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that are
analogous to what took place in this case,” such as “a case in which a constable
secreted himself somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in
order to monitor the movements of the owner,” and, he added, even then “this would
have required either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both.”162 Even in this
hypothetical, however, by using all of his senses, the constable almost certainly
would have learned more than the limited information transmitted by a GPS device
and could not have simultaneously informed his colleagues of his location in the
manner that a GPS device transmits data to those monitoring it. Unsurprisingly, in
Jones the Court ultimately retreated on this point, writing: “[I]t is quite irrelevant
whether there was an 18th-century analog.”163
In truth, we have no way of knowing whether, in the framing era, the limited
intrusion on the home accomplished by a thermal imager or a GPS device would
have been regarded an invasion of an interest too ephemeral to merit legal protec-
tion. Even Lawrence Lessig, generally an advocate of “translating” framing-era
understandings in light of contemporary circumstances,164 has acknowledged the
limits of historical inquiry; he concedes that the framers never “worked out what the
amendment would protect in a world where perfectly noninvasive searches could be
conducted. . . . When their world differs from ours in a way that reveals a choice
they did not have to make, then we need to make that choice.”165
The problem of utilizing framing-era conceptions of reasonableness in contem-
porary circumstances is not confined to issues involving technological change. In
Terry, for example, the Court recognized investigative authority unknown in the
framing era, as Justice Douglas argued in his dissenting opinion in that case.166 Yet,
it is unclear that this expansion in investigative authority should be regarded as
“unreasonable” in the constitutional sense if experience has demonstrated that police
needed additional investigative authority to maintain social stability in complex
162 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 n.3 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
163 Id. at 950 n.3.
164 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1174–211
(1997); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 395, 401–14 (1995).
165 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 149–50 (1999).
166 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). More recently,
Justice Scalia launched a similar attack on Terry based on his understanding of framing-era
law. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380–81 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). For
discussions of the tension between Terry and framing-era practice, see Rosenthal, supra note
17, at 330–37. See also Sklansky, supra note 129, at 1804–05; Thomas, supra note 144,
at 1514–16.
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urban settings unknown in the framing era.167 Perhaps a libertarian conception of the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness had more purchase in the framing era simply
because framing-era law enforcement did not face the challenges to social stability
prevalent in contemporary urban America.168 Similarly, as Professor Stuntz ob-
served, the framing-era “mere evidence” rule that prohibited seizure of a suspect’s
business records or other papers made it much more difficult to prosecute a wide
variety of white collar crime, and, accordingly, the Court’s retreat from that rule was
central to the government’s ability to enforce a wide variety of regulatory measures
that came to be regarded as appropriate in an increasingly complex economy.169 In
short, what was regarded as constitutionally “reasonable” in the framing era may not
remain so in vastly changed circumstances.
Thus, as Anthony Amsterdam concluded, “history is a standoff.”170 The framers
placed in the Constitution not a codification of the limitations on the authority of the
framing-era officers, or a command that the existing balance between liberty and
governmental power be preserved, but a prohibition on “unreasonable” search and
seizure, a formulation that even in the argot of the day represented little more than
a legal conclusion, as we have seen.171 There is little reason to believe that the Fourth
Amendment’s text, written at such a high level of generality, is properly understood
even as a matter of original meaning to forbid the kind of evolution that had become
accepted in the often indeterminate common law of search and seizure by the time
of the framing.172 To construct the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment, some-
thing more than history is required.
II. THE CENTRAL MEANING OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BINARY SEARCH
It may be understandable that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has not made a
decisive choice between the pragmatic and libertarian conceptions. History, as we
have seen, offers uncertain guidance. As for the process of constitutional adjudica-
tion, courts decide cases as they come along, utilizing the approach that seems best
167 For a more extensive defense of Terry along these lines, see Rosenthal, supra note 17,
at 337–46.
168 For more elaborate arguments along these lines, see Arcila, supra note 150, at 1326–35,
Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the Challenges of Contextual Change and Legal Dynamism
in Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 MISS. L.J. 1085, 1101–21 (2012), and Lawrence
Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1196–202 (2012).
169 See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J.
393, 427–47 (1995).
170 Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 401.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 134–35.
172 For more elaborate arguments in support of this conclusion premised upon the dynamic
character of the common law at the time of the framing, see Dripps, supra note 168, at 1121–
26, and Sklansky, supra note 129, at 1776–813.
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fitted to the facts before them and therefore are rarely forced to make a choice be-
tween overarching constitutional theories.173 In some cases, however, competing
constitutional theories may point to opposing conclusions. It is to these cases that
we must look if we are to determine which of the competing conceptions of the
Fourth Amendment has the most force. As it happens, there is one type of case in
which these competing theories point in decidedly different directions—cases in-
volving binary investigative techniques disclosing no more than probable cause to
believe that a location otherwise hidden to public view contains contraband or evi-
dence of other illegal activity.
A. The Binary Search and the Home
Prior to Florida v. Jardines, the Supreme Court had addressed a binary search
on four occasions. In United States v. Place,174 after holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment permitted the authorities to seize luggage that they reasonably suspect contains
contraband,175 the Court explained that such a seizure may include exposing the lug-
gage to a trained narcotics-detection dog because the procedure “does not require
opening the luggage” nor “expos[ing] noncontraband items that otherwise would
remain hidden from public view,” but instead “discloses only the presence or ab-
sence of narcotics, a contraband item.”176 Thus, the “exposure of respondent’s
luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine—did not constitute
a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”177
Arguably this discussion in Place was unnecessary to the decision because the
Court went on to hold that the dog sniff in that case violated the Fourth Amendment
because the luggage was held an unreasonably long time in the absence of probable
cause before the dog arrived.178
Place’s discussion of binary searches, however, became the basis for the holding
in United States v. Jacobsen.179 In that case, the Court concluded that the use of a
field test by federal agents to determine whether a quantity of powder that had been
found in a package was cocaine did not constitute a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, reasoning that “[a] chemical test that merely discloses whether
or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest
in privacy,” since “even if the results are negative—merely disclosing that the
substance is something other than cocaine—such a result reveals nothing of special
173 Cf. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503,
525–48 (2007) (exploring the reasons that the Court has not settled on a single approach for
determining Fourth Amendment coverage).
174 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
175 Id. at 706.
176 Id. at 707.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 708–10.
179 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
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interest,” and “governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine,
and no other arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.”180
Thus, “[h]ere, as in Place, the likelihood that official conduct of the kind disclosed
by the record will actually compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much
too remote to characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.”181
The Court hewed to this view in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.182 Even as it
held that the use of drug interdiction checkpoints was an unreasonable seizure be-
cause it involved stopping vehicles in the absence of individualized suspicion for the
purposes of generalized crime control,183 the Court added that the use of narcotics-
detection dogs at the checkpoints was governed by Place inasmuch as “an exterior
sniff of an automobile does not require entry into the car and is not designed to
disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics,” and “is
‘much less intrusive than a typical search.’”184
This dictum became a square holding in Illinois v. Caballes.185 Citing Place and
Jacobsen, the Court held that the use of a trained narcotics-detection dog during the
course of an otherwise valid traffic stop to determine if there was probable cause to
believe that a vehicle contains contraband was not a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment because “any interest in possessing contraband cannot be
deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the posses-
sion of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’”186
These earlier binary search cases are classic examples of Fourth Amendment
pragmatism. Jacobsen, for example, stresses that in a binary search case, likelihood
of an invasion of any legally protected privacy interest is too remote to justify the
imposition of Fourth Amendment regulation.187 An approach that rejects application
of the Fourth Amendment to techniques involving low liberty costs and high law-
enforcement benefits seems an emphatic repudiation of the libertarian conception.
Yet, the previous binary search cases involved investigative techniques that had
taken place after the subject’s liberty interests had already been compromised—
Place’s luggage had been validly seized in a public place,188 Jacobsen’s package had
180 Id. at 123.
181 Id. at 124. In other contexts, drug tests might not qualify as binary searches. See, e.g.,
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (“[C]hemical analysis of urine,
like that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee, including
whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Nor can it be disputed that the process
of collecting the sample to be tested, which may in some cases involve visual or aural
monitoring of the act of urination, itself implicates privacy interests.”).
182 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
183 Id. at 40–44.
184 Id. at 40 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
185 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
186 Id. at 408 (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123).
187 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124.
188 Place, 462 U.S. at 703–06.
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been validly seized by federal agents,189 and Caballes’s vehicle had been validly
stopped on a public street.190 When liberty interests have not already been compro-
mised in this fashion, perhaps the binary search would be regarded as an invasion
of an interest that should be regarded as protected from the government’s investiga-
tive reach. Although libertarians may disagree on the bounds of the private sphere
in which the government must satisfy a heightened standard for any intrusion on
what is otherwise concealed from public view, certainly that which is concealed
within a residence presents a particularly strong case for Fourth Amendment pro-
tection regardless of the nonintrusive character of or limited information disclosed
by an investigative technique.191
Indeed, this point proved central to the holding in Jardines. In an opinion by
Justice Scalia who, as we have seen, is an advocate of the libertarian conception, the
Court wrote that the Fourth Amendment “establishes a simple baseline, one that for
much of our history formed the exclusive basis for its protections: When ‘the Gov-
ernment obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or
effects, ‘a “search” within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has
‘undoubtedly occurred.’”192 The Court characterized this “baseline” in libertarian
terms: “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unrea-
sonable governmental intrusion.”193 This protection extends to “the area ‘immediately
surrounding and associated with the home’—what our cases call the curtilage.”194
This is the area “‘intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologi-
cally,’ and is where ‘privacy expectations are most heightened.’”195 In particular, the
Court added, “[t]he front porch is the classic exemplar of an area adjacent to the
home and ‘to which the activity of home life extends.’”196 The Court concluded that
the officers’ conduct amounted to “an unlicensed physical intrusion,”197 and that
“the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him
there to conduct a search.”198 Thus, the Court wrote that it “need not decide whether
189 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 118–22.
190 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407.
191 See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
255, 259–69, 272–75 (2006); Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone:
Subconstitutional Status and the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 359–63 (2010);
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 997–1000 (1982).
192 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting United States v. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012)).
193 Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
194 Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
195 Id. at 1415 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
196 Id. (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 1416.
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the officers’ investigation of Jardines’ home violated his expectation of privacy
under Katz.”199 This case fell within the Fourth Amendment’s protections because
“the officers learned what they learned only by physically intruding on Jardines’
property to gather evidence. ”200
B. The Uncertain Libertarianism of Jardines
Even libertarians are likely to find little to celebrate in Jardines because the
property-based protection recognized by the Court is so narrow and easily circum-
vented.
As we have seen, the holding in Jardines rests on the existence of a physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.201 The narrowness of that holding
means it is readily circumvented. With respect to persons, papers, and effects, a dog
sniff involves no physical intrusion and accordingly is not subject to constitutional
regulation under Place and Caballes—a questionable account from a libertarian
perspective.202 Even with respect to the home, Jardines offers limited protections.
Consider, for example, the use of a narcotics-detection canine in a hallway outside
199 Id. at 1417.
200 Id. As these passages make clear, the Court repeatedly used the concept of a physical
intrusion rather than using the term trespass, which featured prominently in the prior term’s
decision, also written by Justice Scalia, in Jones. See supra text accompanying notes 119–24.
In Jones, Justice Alito objected to the use of trespass because this would seemingly make the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment turn on the vagaries of tort law. See United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 961–62 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Indeed, reliance
on a tort law concept such as trespass would have been particularly anomalous in Jardines
because the Florida courts had never intimated that the officers had committed a trespass as a
matter of state tort law. See State v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1, 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he
officer and the dog were lawfully present at the defendant’s front door.”), quashed sub nom.
Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409
(2013). Moreover, to hold his majority in Jardines, Justice Scalia needed Justices Ginsburg
and Kagan to join his opinion, yet both had joined Justice Alito’s opinion in Jones. This
likely explains Justice Scalia’s use of the more generic concept of a physical intrusion, rather
than the seemingly tort-law concept of a trespass, thereby avoiding the perhaps unintended
implication in Jones that Fourth Amendment analysis might turn on state tort law. It is also
possible that Justice Scalia had been persuaded by the view that Jones erred in tying Fourth
Amendment law to trespass rather than property rights. See Kerr, supra note 49, at 90–93.
Yet, given that a trespass requires an invasion to a legally protected property interest, the
difference between characterizing the scope of constitutional protection in terms of a physical
intrusion on property or a trespassory invasion may be more semantic than substantive.
201 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
202 Cf. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 938–52 (2010) (arguing that Fourth Amendment
doctrine should focus on protection of intimate facts rather than the boundaries of the home).
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an apartment.203 As we have seen, the Fourth Amendment protects only persons,
houses, papers, and effects; the common area in an apartment building frequently
traversed by strangers may not qualify as a location “‘intimately linked to the home,
both physically and psychologically’ . . . where ‘privacy expectations are most
heightened.’”204 Perhaps, if the dog physically touched the apartment door, the
Fourth Amendment might apply; under the pre-Katz decision in Silverman v. United
States,205 the use of a spike microphone that made physical contact with a heating
duct in the petitioners’ home, which “convert[ed] their entire heating system into a
conductor of sound,”206 was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
because “the officers overheard the petitioners’ conversations only by usurping part
of the petitioners’ house or office—a heating system which was an integral part of
the premises occupied by the petitioners,” which constituted an “actual intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area.”207 It is far from clear that physical contact between
the nose of a narcotics-detection dog and an apartment door represents a similar
intrusion, but even if it were, a skilled handler could likely keep the dog far enough
away from the door to avoid the writ of Jardines.208
The limits of Jardines are even more plainly illustrated by the potential develop-
ment of a computer search program hypothesized by one student commentator that
could be used to search the hard drive of every computer connected to the Internet
and identify the presence of digital contraband, such as an illegally modified pro-
gram or child pornography.209 This would unquestionably permit the authorities to
203 See Stabler v. State, 990 So. 2d 1258, 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 90 So.
3d 267 (Fla. 2012); Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Davis,
711 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
204 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
To be sure, a “house,” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, includes “curtilage,” but the
Court has explained that
curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four
factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home,
the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by
the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). Under these factors, the common halls of
an apartment building seem poor candidates for protection, if indeed any common area could
ever qualify as curtilage. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32–33 (1st Cir.
1998); United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir. 1992); McClintock v. State, 405
S.W.2d 277, 283–84 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2013).
205 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
206 Id. at 507.
207 Id. at 511, 512.
208 Cf. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–36 (1942), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the use of a listening device to overhear a conversa-
tion in an adjoining office did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
209 See Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband: The
Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093, 1097–100 (1996). For a
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learn information otherwise concealed within a home, but it would involve no phys-
ical intrusion that would trigger the “baseline” protections of Jardines.
Beyond all this, it is entirely unclear whether Jardines offers any meaningful
protection against binary searches. The Court’s precise holding was narrow: “The
government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate
surroundings is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”210 Notably,
the Court did not decide whether the search was also “unreasonable” within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment.211 It might well be anomalous to hold binary search
techniques to the same standards as a physical search of a house, given their limited
intrusiveness. Indeed, later in the same term that produced Jardines, the Court
wrote, as it upheld the routine use of a buccal swab on the inside of an arrestee’s
cheek to extract a DNA sample: “The fact [that] an intrusion is negligible is of cen-
tral relevance to determining reasonableness, although it is still a search as the law
defines that term.”212 Accordingly, despite the holding in Jardines, the pragmatic
arguments against restricting binary searches, at least involving a limited intrusion,
could still carry the day.
The narrowness of Jardines accordingly undermines its libertarian virtues. It is
surely a stunted brand of libertarianism that understands the Fourth Amendment to
recognize a zone where individuals can be free from official scrutiny that involves
only one’s home but which regards the government as free to peer within the home
as long as it uses technology that requires no physical intrusion or which regards
such intrusions as reasonable even when they invade property interests.
On this score, libertarians might argue that, at least with respect to the home,
Kyllo can supplement Jardines by offering protection through its insistence that tech-
nology should not be permitted to erode the privacy of the home regardless of the
limited significance of what is disclosed by “sense-enhancing technology.”213 Yet,
even assuming that the use of a narcotics-detection dog constitutes “sense-enhancing
helpful discussion of how such a program could be used to search computers connected to
the Internet for contraband, see Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and the Power
of the Hash, 119 HARV. L. REV. 38 (2006).
210 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013). Indeed, the Court limited its
grant of certiorari “to the question of whether the officers’ behavior was a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1414.
211 To be sure, the Court’s admonition that if the Fourth Amendment meant that “the
State’s agents could stand in a home’s porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with
impunity, the right to retreat would be significantly diminished,” might imply that the use
of a narcotics-detection dog on the curtilage of a home in the absence of a warrant issued on
probable cause is constitutionally unreasonable, but Jardines stops short of a square holding
on that point. Id. at 1414. Similarly, in Jones, the Court did not reach the question whether
the attachment and use of the GPS device was constitutionally unreasonable. See United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
212 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013).
213 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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technology”214 or that the use of the Internet to examine the contents of a computer
constitutes a “search,”215 there remains great doubt that binary search techniques
qualify for constitutional regulation under Kyllo. For one thing, Kyllo makes plain
that the sending of an electronic transmission within the walls of a home cannot
qualify as the kind of physical intrusion that triggers the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment; the Court refused to permit that the applicability of the Fourth Amend-
ment turn on whether technology accomplished “off-the-wall” or “through-the-wall
surveillance,” explaining that it had “rejected such a mechanical interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment in Katz,” and concluding that “there is no substance to this
distinction.”216 For another, the Court noted that the thermal-imaging technology
was capable of disclosing innocent activity within a home, such as “at what hour
each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.”217 In its subsequent
decision upholding a dog sniff in Caballes, the Court distinguished the thermal-
imaging technology used in Kyllo on just that basis.218 Thus, Kyllo stops short of
supporting the view that a binary search, even in the absence of a warrant issued on
probable cause, violates the Fourth Amendment.219
Considered in this light, it becomes difficult to identify the libertarian virtues
in Jardines, even as supplemented by Kyllo. The protection Jardines offers from
official scrutiny of the home is uncertain at best. Plainly, the libertarian conception
requires an argument that might support a more vigorous Fourth Amendment rule
than can be found within the four corners of the holdings in Jardines and Kyllo.
Accordingly, even after Jardines, there is little reason to believe that a satisfac-
tory libertarian account has emerged. Treating the home as a zone where one is free
from official scrutiny is hardly satisfactory if the rule is easily circumvented, and,
as we have seen, it seems that the protection offered by Jardines is subject to ready
circumvention as long as the authorities can avoid physical intrusion on the home,
214 For an argument that narcotics-detection dogs in some respects qualify as advanced
technology, see Irus Braverman, Passing the Sniff Test: Police Dogs as Surveillance Tech-
nology, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 81, 133–58 (2013).
215 Although the case law regarding the application of the Fourth Amendment to the
Internet is in its infancy, the principles that have been developed in the wake of Katz for
applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies powerfully suggest that any effort to
ascertain the content of information available through the Internet which is not generally
open to scrutiny of the public at large is ordinarily considered a search. See, e.g., Susan W.
Brenner, Fourth Amendment Future: Remote Computer Searches and the Use of Virtual
Force, 81 MISS. L.J. 112, 1238–44 (2012); Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment
to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1017–31 (2010).
216 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35, 36.
217 Id. at 38.
218 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005).
219 Kyllo offers another potential qualification by treating technological surveillance as
subject to Fourth Amendment regulation “where (as here) the technology in question is not
in general public use.” 533 U.S. at 34.
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and perhaps even by characterizing a trespassory “search” undertaken by a trained
narcotics-detection dog or other binary methods as constitutionally reasonable. To
be sure, Jardines importantly notes that property-based Fourth Amendment protec-
tions supplement, rather than replace, the protections offered by Katz.220 As we have
seen, however, the pre-Jardines binary search cases understood Katz to deny pro-
tection from binary searches.
Still, perhaps Jardines, when combined with a more robust version of Kyllo,
might preclude binary searches unless authorized by a warrant issued on probable
cause. Absent this, however, Jardines does a rather feeble job of limiting official
scrutiny by means of binary search. Thus, if Jardines is to achieve its stated objec-
tive of affording meaningful protection against official scrutiny of the home, we
must turn to the arguments for a rule that would make the home “secure” from
surveillance in the form of a binary search. We will now see, however, that there are
enormous problems with a libertarian conception along these lines.
C. The Problematic Case for Fourth Amendment Regulation of the Binary Search
The most obvious route to a coherent account that would offer comprehensive
Fourth Amendment protection against a binary search is to conclude that whenever
the authorities use any sort of investigative technique to learn of the presence of an
item otherwise concealed from public view, they have performed a “search” subject to
regulation under the Fourth Amendment that should be subject to ordinary rules requir-
ing reasonable suspicion or probable cause, as a number of scholars have argued.221
Coupling Jardines with a more robust version of Kyllo could, of course, achieve
that objective. And, it is most likely the case that in terms of general social expecta-
tions of privacy, most of us probably do not believe that our vehicles, and especially
our homes, are open to official scrutiny through binary investigative techniques. Yet,
resolving Fourth Amendment issues by reference to popular sensibilities seems a
problematic approach. If the protection of privacy should be measured by popular
220 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).
221 See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a “Search” Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 37–52 (2006); John M.A. DiPippa, Is the Fourth Amendment
Obsolete?—Restating the Fourth Amendment in Functional Terms, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 483,
502–03 (1987); Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is
Made Of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 781, 816–21 (2008); Harris, supra note 8, at 37–45; Cecil
J. Hunt, II, Calling in the Dogs: Suspicionless Sniff Searches and Reasonable Expectations
of Privacy, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 285, 296–98 (2005); Maclin, supra note 140, at 101–06;
Robert C. Power, Technology and the Fourth Amendment: A Proposed Formulation for Visual
Searches, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 59–61 (1989); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo:
A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1321–29 (2002); Solove, supra note 95, at 1527–33; James J. Tomkovicz,
Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS.
L.J. 317, 385–92, 435–44 (2002).
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sensibilities, it would seem better to leave regulation of searches to the politically
accountable branches of government, who are more likely to be responsive to those
sensibilities than a cloistered judiciary.222 Deferring to popular sensibility is not the
approach the Court has taken; it has left unregulated many investigative techniques
that the available empirical evidence suggests infringes what the public regards as
reasonable expectations of privacy.223
Moreover, there is a powerful, if pragmatic, argument against a universal re-
quirement that investigative techniques that disclose previously concealed informa-
tion surmount a threshold standard of predication, such as reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. If investigations can begin only after surmounting such a threshold,
then unless the authorities somehow blunder onto sufficient evidence of predication,
they will be stymied. Especially for the kinds of crimes that are committed covertly
and are unlikely to be uncovered absent proactive investigation, a universal require-
ment of predication could cripple law enforcement.224 Indeed, there is increasing
evidence that aggressive and proactive law-enforcement patrol tactics are particu-
larly effective in combating crime.225 Thus, wholly reactive policing, in which the
police wait until someone provides them with predication to investigate, is likely to
222 Cf. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 145, at 854 (“If the Constitution were . . . a novel
invitation to apply current societal values, what reason would there be to believe that the
invitation was addressed to the courts rather than the legislature?”).
223 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 94, at 106–16; Jeremy A. Blumenthal et al., The Multiple
Dimensions of Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331,
352–54 (2009); Henry F. Fradella et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring “Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 362–67
(2011); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recog-
nized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 738–42 (1993).
224 Cf. Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragma-
tism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 51–57 (2011) (expressing similar
concerns with respect to proposals to require predication for initiating investigations based
on otherwise protected speech).
225 See, e.g., COMM. TO IMPROVE RESEARCH INFO. & DATA ON FIREARMS, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 230–35 (Charles F.
Wellford et al. eds., 2005); COMM. TO REVIEW RESEARCH ON POLICE POL’Y & PRACTICES,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE
235–40 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004); Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman,
The Crime Drop and Beyond, 2006 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 125, 136–37; Anthony A. Braga,
The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime, 578 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104,
113–19 (2001). For discussions of the turn toward proactive policing strategies, see, for
example, John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent
Crime? An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207, 228–45
(Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., rev. ed. 2006). See also Debra Livingston, Police
Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New
Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 572–84 (1997); Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal
Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 81–91 (2003).
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be seriously ineffective. Accordingly, it is likely reasonable, in the constitutional
sense, to keep some substantial realm of effective, if relatively nonintrusive, investi-
gative techniques largely unregulated so that the authorities can utilize them to
acquire the evidentiary predication necessary to utilize more intrusive techniques.
Moreover, as Professor Kerr has observed, when the Court holds that a given tactic
is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, one way of under-
standing such a conclusion is that the tactic is invariably reasonable and hence not
in need of regulation.226 And, as we have seen, on the pragmatic account, the binary
search presents a particularly strong case for rejecting regulation because the binary
search discloses little of interest about anyone but the guilty.
Accordingly, for a pragmatist, there is little reason to limit binary searches un-
less their costs in terms of liberty outweigh the benefits of leaving them unregulated.
As the Court explained in the classically pragmatic Terry v. Ohio, “[T]here is ‘no
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
(or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.’”227 If there is
good reason to leave relatively nonintrusive binary search techniques unregulated
in light of their limited costs to privacy, then, on the pragmatic account, they should
not be subject to limitation under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, as we have seen,
Fourth Amendment law already treats many investigative techniques as compromis-
ing such limited privacy or liberty interests that they remain constitutionally unregu-
lated.228 It is therefore no more than a doctrinal detail whether a binary search should
be deemed a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment that is neverthe-
less invariably reasonable even in the absence of individualized suspicion or not a
search at all. If a particular practice should be among those in which the authorities
are permitted to engage in order to gather sufficient evidence to satisfy the probable-
cause or reasonable-suspicion standards, then there is little pragmatic justification
for subjecting it to judicial oversight. And, as we have seen, this is a question that
remains open after Jardines; even if a binary search method involves “‘physically
intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or effects,”229 Jardines does not reach the
question whether such a technique is “unreasonable” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
There are, of course, a number of pragmatic arguments that could support con-
stitutional regulation of binary searches. For example, one could argue that the unre-
stricted use of a narcotics-detection dog or other binary search technique undermines
226 See Kerr, supra note 173, at 526–31.
227 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S.
523, 536–37 (1967)); accord, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
228 See supra notes 97–104 and accompanying text.
229 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting United States v. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012)).
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the sense of security one should be entitled to enjoy in an otherwise private space.230
In her separate opinion in Jardines, Justice Kagan advanced an argument along these
lines, claiming that “in every way that matters,” Jardines was like a case in which
“a stranger comes to the front door of your home carrying super-high-powered
binoculars,” and then “uses the binoculars to peer through your windows, into your
home’s furthest corners.”231 The visitor, Justice Kagan concluded, has not only
“trespassed on your property,” but “he also invaded your ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy’ by nosing into intimacies.”232
Yet, this pragmatic argument for protecting the security of the home against
official scrutiny loses its force precisely because binary searches disclose no more
than the presence or absence of contraband—a point that somehow escaped Justice
Kagan as she analogized the dog sniff to peering inside of a home.233 Unlike Kyllo,
where, as we have seen, the thermal imaging device could disclose details about the
innocent use of a sauna or high-power binoculars that could disclose any number of
innocent details about one’s home life, the binary search compromises no liberty or
privacy interest in possessing lawful items and otherwise results in no intrusion,
physical or otherwise, on privacy. With respect to the innocent, a binary search tells
investigators nothing about what is in a home or other location otherwise concealed
from public view; instead, they learn only what is not present. Accordingly, as the
pre-Jardines binary search cases explain, it is hard to understand how such an in-
vestigative technique compromises the privacy interests of persons, houses, papers,
or effects to any meaningful extent—except for the interest in possessing contra-
band. The argument for regulating the binary search must identify some coherent
social good served by regulating official scrutiny that discloses no more than the
presence or absence of contraband.
There is, to be sure, a pragmatic argument for protecting the guilty to deter
unjustified intrusions on the security of the innocent as well.234 That consideration,
however, has little force for binary search techniques that disclose nothing of sig-
nificance about the innocent. Indeed, precisely because the binary search disag-
gregates the interests of the innocent and the guilty, it places to one side the most
230 See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 422 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Gruber, supra note 221, at 823–27; Hunt, supra note 221, at 305–14.
231 Jardines,133 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
232 Id.
233 For an endorsement of Justice Kagan’s view that similarly ignores this point, see
Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 634, 682–86
(2013).
234 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 110 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 719 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 120–21 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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powerful pragmatic argument that is ordinarily advanced in favor of Fourth Amend-
ment restraint on investigatory power—the claim that we must inhibit the ability of
the government to gather evidence against the guilty in order to protect the innocent.
Justice Kagan’s argument for regulating the binary search, in short, wrongly con-
flates binary and non-binary searches. For that reason, it simply will not do.
A pragmatist might still argue for regulation of binary search techniques, ob-
serving that there will inevitably be some error rate associated with binary search
techniques that might result in the issuance of warrants even though no contraband
is to be found within the area to be searched, but it is difficult to understand how
protecting individuals against this type of error is the function of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The Fourth Amendment authorizes the issuance of warrants authorizing search
and seizure on probable cause, even though probable cause requires only a “fair
probability,”235 which is “a standard well short of absolute certainty.”236 If we as-
sume that an alert by a properly trained narcotics-detection dog possesses sufficient
reliability to invoke the binary search cases, then a positive dog sniff, like the pos-
itive field test at issue in Jacobsen or the hypothesized contraband-search program,
is tantamount to a finding of probable cause.237 Thus, whatever error rate may inhere
235 E.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. One v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009); United
States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95–97 (2006); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989);
New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 876–77 (1986); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238–39 (1983).
236 Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615 (2007) (per curiam).
237 Justice Souter, dissenting in Caballes, questioned whether narcotics-detection dogs are
sufficiently reliable that a dog’s alert can be considered an invariable indication of the pres-
ence of contraband and for that reason thought the case should be governed by Kyllo. See
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411–13 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). Others have taken
a similar view. See, e.g., George M. Dery III, Who Let the Dogs Out? The Supreme Court
Did in Illinois v. Caballes by Placing Absolute Faith in Canine Sniffs, 58 RUTGERS L. REV.
377, 403–06 (2006); Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending
the Protection of the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 NEB. L. REV. 735, 754–65
(2007). Yet, Justice Souter and the commentators cited above have argued no more than that
dog sniffs are fallible; this stops short of an argument that they are insufficiently reliable to
generate probable cause. Indeed, in Caballes, the Court noted that Justice Souter did not
“deny that a dog’s reaction may provide reasonable suspicion, or probable cause, to search
the container or enclosure; the Fourth Amendment does not demand certainty of success to
justify a search for evidence or contraband.” 543 U.S. at 413. Most commentators agree that
an alert by a trained dog, even if not infallible, amounts to probable cause. See, e.g., Mark E.
Smith, Comment, Going to the Dogs: Evaluating the Proper Standard for Narcotic Detector
Dog Searches of Private Residences, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 103, 116–38 (2009); see also Jane
Bambauer, Defending the Dog, 91 OR. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2013) (evidence of error rates
in canine narcotics-detection overlooks that “[a]ll probable cause is probabilistic”). Others,
however, have doubted this conclusion. See, e.g., Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and
Probable Cause, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 14–18 (2006). Although there may be room
to debate what type of proof should be regarded as sufficient to establish that a dog is
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in a binary search technique sufficiently reliable to generate probable cause is one
that the Fourth Amendment regards as acceptable.238 Accordingly, in constitutional
terms, a search is “binary” if it discloses no more than the presence or absence of
probable cause—a standard which, if satisfied, supports issuance of a warrant that
would properly authorize a conventional, if non-binary, search of locations hidden
from public view.
A pragmatist might also believe, however, that the costs of a binary search are
not limited to the risk of false positives. The use of a narcotics-detection dog during
a police confrontation with a suspect could be embarrassing, if not frightening, even
for the innocent.239 Indeed, in Jardines, as it rejected the State’s argument that the
public has a customary invitation to utilize the front walkway and porch of a resi-
dence, the Court wrote:
To find a visitor knocking on the door is routine (even if some-
times unwelcome); to spot that same visitor exploring the front
path with a metal detector, or marching his bloodhound into the
adequately trained and reliable, see generally Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the
Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 KY. L.J. 405 (1997) (exploring
this question), just a few weeks before it decided Jardines, the Court unanimously held that
if a bona fide organization has certified a dog as reliable, or the dog has recently completed
a training program that assessed its proficiency, “a court can presume (subject to any con-
flicting evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to search,” Florida v.
Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013).
238 One could also argue pragmatically that binary search techniques are problematic
because of the potential for their arbitrary or discriminatory use. See, e.g., Amanda M. Basch,
Note, Sniffing Out the Problems: A Casenote Study of the Analysis and Effects of the Supreme
Court’s Decision in Illinois v. Caballes, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. INT. L. REV. 417, 441–42
(2006); Brett Geiger, Comment, People v. Caballes: An Analysis of Caballes, The History
of Sniff Search Jurisprudence, and its Future Impact, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 595, 615–16
(2006). But cf. Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 347–56 (expressing skepticism about claims of
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in urban policing). If this is a problem, however,
it is one for all of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court has held that the alleged dis-
criminatory motive of an investigator is irrelevant to the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Although allegedly
discriminatory enforcement decisions are subject to challenge under the Equal Protection
Clause, the demanding standard governing such claims requires proof that a similarly situated
individual was treated differently. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465–68
(1996). If the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is thought to be sufficiently
great to require doctrinal innovation, surely the last place to begin is the binary search, which
constitutes the investigative technique that is less likely to compromise the interests of the
innocent than techniques that currently receive fairly little constitutional scrutiny.
239 See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 221, at 822–23; Hunt, supra note 221, at 285–86; Leslie A.
Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable Expansion of Canine
Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home, 88 OR. L. REV. 829, 880–87 (2009).
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garden before saying hello and asking permission, would inspire
most of us to—well, call the police.240
Yet, in Jardines, this observation was not offered to explain why the use of a
narcotics-detection dog on a front porch is inconsistent with “the background social
norms that invite a visitor to the front door.”241 For that purpose, it may persuade,
but it is far from clear that it supplies a basis to brand binary search techniques as
constitutionally unreasonable searches.
The fact that an investigative technique might be regarded as alarming or embar-
rassing is generally not regarded as sufficient to brand it a constitutionally unreason-
able search or seizure. To the contrary, as we have seen, the use of narcotics-detection
dogs in Place and Caballes were not regarded as sufficient to brand the seizures in
those cases constitutionally unreasonable, even though they no doubt added to the
stress and potential embarrassment in those encounters. As long as the police are
permitted to initiate investigations without probable cause in order to generate the
evidence necessary to utilize more intrusive techniques, mistakes are inevitable, even
though they may doubtless generate embarrassment or worse. Yet, absent the use
of coercion, such tactics are generally considered to be consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. For example, even when a uniformed officer approaches a suspect in
the absence of individualized suspicion to undertake official questioning, that is not
regarded as sufficiently coercive to trigger Fourth Amendment protection.242 Simi-
larly, a surprise raid on a workplace by immigration officials who then engaged in
systematic questioning of employees while other agents stationed themselves at the
exits was not regarded as sufficiently coercive to fall within the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment.243 The Court has also held that even absent probable cause or a war-
rant, when police approached the door to a residence, “banged on the door as loud
as [they] could and announced either ‘Police, police, police’ or ‘This is the police,’”
their “conduct was entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”244 These con-
texts are not precisely analogous to approaching the front door of a house with a
narcotics-detection dog, but they do suggest that even a likelihood of causing embar-
rassment or alarm to a potentially innocent suspect may be insufficient to brand an
investigative tactic constitutionally unreasonable.
Even so, perhaps the potential embarrassment, alarm, or humiliation experienced
that could be produced by the presence of a narcotics-detection dog and its handler on
one’s curtilage may be sufficient to brand this technique constitutionally unreasonable
240 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013).
241 Id.
242 See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01, 204–05 (2002).
243 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216–21 (1984).
244 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (2011).
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absent sufficient predication.245 It is more difficult to understand, however, why this
would be the case if the search is conducted in a discreet fashion and when the target
is unaware that it is taking place, as was apparently the case in Jardines.246 In any
event, the conclusion that the use of a narcotics-detection dog outside a residence is
unreasonable because it threatens alarm and embarrassment is eminently pragmatic—
it ultimately brands such binary searches as “unjustified intrusions” as Justice Brandeis
used that term because of the unwarranted injury that it might inflict on even inno-
cent individuals. Moreover, this argument supplies no basis to restrict binary search
techniques that do not involve a physical trespass and that are utilized without the
target or other members of the public ever knowing, such as a computer search for
digital contraband.
Accordingly, with the possible exception of physical intrusions that might
produce unwarranted alarm in the innocent no less than the guilty, the pragmatic
argument for regulating binary searches necessarily rests on their impact on the
guilty alone; binary searches unaccompanied by a physical intrusion simply do not
have a sufficient impact on the innocent to warrant regulation, as the pre-Jardines
binary search cases uniformly concluded. Moreover, in pragmatic terms, the benefits
of a technique that reliably identifies locations at which there is probable cause to
search, while disclosing little else of interest, seem to dwarf its costs. If a binary
search technique is a reliable indicator of probable cause, then when the technique
generates a negative result, it produces few, if any, costs in terms of liberty, and
when the technique produces a positive result, the Constitution itself tells us that the
benefits of the ensuing non-binary search outweigh its costs precisely because it is
supported by probable cause.247 In this fashion, binary search techniques facilitate
the detection of crime while disclosing nothing else of particular interest, much less
compromising important interests of the innocent. Thus, the pragmatic case for con-
straining nonintrusive binary search techniques seems wanting, as the pre-Jardines
245 See also Gruber, supra note 221, at 822–23; Hunt, supra note 221, at 285–86; Katz &
Golembiewski, supra note 237, at 752–53; Lunney, supra note 239, at 880–87. The Florida
Supreme Court advanced an argument along these lines in Jardines. See Jardines v. State,
73 So. 2d 34, 48–49 (Fla. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
For a more general argument that the Fourth Amendment should regard as unreasonable
investigative techniques that target potentially innocent individuals in a manner that could
produce a stigmatic injury, see Colb, supra note 79, at 1491–94.
246 Cf. Timothy C. MacDonnell, Florida v. Jardines: The Wolf at the Castle Door, 7
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIB. 1, 50 (2013) (“The [Florida Supreme C]ourt concluded this particular dog
sniff created a public spectacle, and yet Jardines himself was apparently unaware of the
spectacle occurring right outside his front door.”).
247 Cf. Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 585, 660–70 (2011) (arguing that nonintrusive binary search techniques satisfy
traditional Fourth Amendment standards for reasonableness); Simmons, supra note 95, at 579–
85 (arguing that binary investigative techniques likely have benefits exceeding their costs
when false-positive rates are low).
2014]    BINARY SEARCHES & THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S CENTRAL MEANING 925
binary search cases powerfully suggest. It remains, however, to consider the libertar-
ian case against the binary search.
In Jardines, all the Court offered to support its libertarian conception was
history—the claim that property-based protection had been historically at the core
of the Fourth Amendment.248 When it comes to binary searches, however, the his-
torical case for constitutional regulation is on unsteady ground. As we have seen in
Part I.D above, history provides uncertain guidance when choosing between libertarian
and pragmatic conceptions of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. History is equally
unclear about the propriety of binary search methods that disclose no more than the
presence of contraband. After all, constraining binary search techniques would pro-
vide little, if any, protection except to the guilty, and the framing-era support for
such an approach is highly debatable.249 In the framing era, the remedy for a wrong-
ful search and seizure was not exclusion of incriminating evidence, but an award of
damages in tort.250 Moreover, if a search produced incriminating evidence, that was
considered a defense to tort liability.251 There is scholarly debate about whether this
defense was recognized for a trespass to a house, with only a handful of cases avail-
able as evidence to support the conflicting positions of legal historians on this point.252
Moreover, as we have seen, it is far from clear how framing-era law would have
treated an investigative technique that disclosed no more than the presence of con-
traband.253 Something more than history is required to offer adequate support for a
libertarian resolution of binary search debate.
248 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
249 See supra Part I.D.
250 See AMAR, supra note 3, at 20–22; William Gangi, The Exclusionary Rule: A Case
Study in Judicial Usurpation, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 33, 39–46, 125–29 (1984). Although one
scholar has argued that something resembling the exclusionary rule existed in the framing era,
see Roots, supra note 51, at 14–20, most of the framing-era precedents he cites involve the
very different remedy of release from custody as a remedy for wrongful arrest, see id. at 20–30.
He also cites the framing-era rule prohibiting the seizure of “mere evidence,” yet, as we have
seen, this rule did not protect contraband, which is precisely the type of evidence disclosed
through a binary search. See id. at 37–45. As Professor Amar observed, no less an authority
on framing-era law than Justice Story wrote that “evidence is admissible on charges for the
highest crimes, even though it may have been obtained by a trespass upon the person, or by
any other forcible and illegal means.” AMAR, supra note 3, at 21 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, there is ample reason to doubt the claim that there was framing-era support
for the exclusion of incriminating evidence based on the manner in which it was obtained.
For my own explication of the difficulties with efforts to support or defend the exclusionary
rule on the basis of historical evidence, see Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven Theses in Grudging
Support of the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 525, 532–37 (2013).
251 See AMAR, supra note 3, at 7.
252 Compare Davies, supra note 131, at 647–49 (denying the existence of immunity), with
Arcila, supra note 150, at 1316–24 (arguing that immunity was recognized).
253 See supra notes 155–69 and accompanying text.
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In his dissenting opinion in Jacobsen, Justice Brennan endeavored to make a
libertarian case against the binary search. Deregulation of binary search techniques,
he contended, would mean
if a device were developed that could detect, from the outside of
a building, the presence of cocaine inside, there would be no
constitutional obstacle to the police cruising through a residen-
tial neighborhood and using the device to identify all homes in
which the drug is present. . . . [U]nder the interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment first suggested in Place and first applied in
this case, these surveillance techniques would not constitute
searches and therefore could be freely pursued whenever and
wherever law enforcement officers desire. Hence, at some point
in the future, if the Court stands by the theory it has adopted
today, search warrants, probable cause, and even “reasonable
suspicion” may very well become notions of the past.254
Some of Justice Brennan’s argument is surely overstated. Treating a binary
search as constitutionally unregulated does not render the standard of probable cause
or warrant requirement obsolete as long as a judicial official must determine whether
the binary search has produced probable cause and issued a warrant prior to a phys-
ical entry. Moreover, if a warrant is obtained on the basis of the dog’s alert, then
judicial review of the sufficiency of the evidence of probable cause will occur prior to
any physical search and seizure, eliminating the pragmatic concern that those engaged
in law enforcement will be too quick to conclude that probable cause is present.
Still, aside from the insupportable claim that an unregulated binary search ren-
ders the probable-cause and warrant requirements superfluous, it is worth consider-
ing whether the Fourth Amendment ought to prevent the government from learning
where contraband is concealed—and where it is not—at least absent a warrant issued
on probable cause.
In the libertarian conception, even if binary search techniques involve little
intrusion on the interest of the innocent in secluding the home from official scrutiny,
the Fourth Amendment nevertheless offers something to the guilty because it oper-
ates as a limitation on the government’s investigative powers. Thus, under the Fourth
Amendment, the power to declare an item contraband does not imply a concomi-
tantly broad power to search without limitation for such contraband. Within one’s
home or similarly “private” zone, on the libertarian account, the individual is sov-
ereign, and accordingly beyond the government’s reach, at least absent a warrant
issued on probable cause. The point has Fourth Amendment resonance; the Fourth
Amendment grants a right to be “secure” against unreasonable search and seizure;
254 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984).
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presumably the right to be secure against official scrutiny is of Fourth Amendment
concern.255 This objection gains force, it is added, when a binary search discloses
information about the home, where privacy and autonomy interests are generally
thought to be at their greatest.256 Indeed, precisely such an argument was advanced
against a binary search of computers in the note that first hypothesized the potential
for this investigative technique.257
On this point, as it explained why the use of a field test for the presence of co-
caine was not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, in Jacobsen,
the Court response to Justice Brennan was instructive: “Congress has decided—and
there is no question about its power to do so—to treat the interest in ‘privately’ pos-
sessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal whether a
substance is cocaine, and no other arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no legitimate
privacy interest.”258 This observation presents a serious challenge to the libertarian
conception of the Fourth Amendment. If, as a matter of substantive constitutional
law, there is no right to possess cocaine in one’s home, it should follow that it is
“reasonable” in the constitutional sense to enforce this limitation on the individual’s
right of “retreat” into the home—as long as the government uses binary search meth-
ods that do not compromise any legitimate security interest in the privacy of the home.
Consider Gonzales v. Raich,259 in which the Court, echoing its earlier observa-
tion in Jacobsen, held that Congress can prohibit even the wholly intrastate manu-
facture and possession of marijuana as an incident of its authority to regulate interstate
commerce because these intrastate activities necessarily affect interstate markets:
One need not have a degree in economics to understand why a
nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other
drugs) locally cultivated for personal use (which presumably
would include use by friends, neighbors, and family members)
may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this
extraordinarily popular substance.260
It follows that Congress may legitimately concern itself with the possession and use
of controlled substances even when they are secreted within an individual’s home—to
255 For helpful discussions of the manner in which the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of
security against unreasonable search and seizure illuminates its meaning, see Clancy, What
Does the Fourth Amendment Protect, supra note 125, at 350–66, and Jed Rubenfeld, The
End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 119–31, 138–51 (2008).
256 See, e.g., Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 237, at 775–78; Lunney, supra note 239,
at 887–89; Smith, supra note 237, at 132–36; Renee Swanson, Comment, Are We Safe at Home
from the Prying Dog Sniff?, 11 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 131, 150–53 (2009).
257 See Adler, supra note 209, at 1110–19.
258 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123.
259 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
260 Id. at 28; see also id. at 39–41 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the extent that individuals can utilize the Fourth Amendment to limit the govern-
ment’s ability to locate contraband stored within their homes, this will inevitably
facilitate the distribution of such contraband, and the attendant social harms. In this
respect, the individual is not “sovereign” over the contents of his own residence—
not when it comes to contraband. Accordingly, a libertarian conception premised on
identifying the limits of governmental authority has difficulty treating contraband
within the home as beyond the legitimate ambit of official scrutiny, at least as long
as substantive constitutional law permits the government to proscribe even the
purely “private” possession of such contraband.
The point is also illustrated by the hypothesized computer worm that could
search for images of unlawful child pornography on any computer connected to the
Internet. In Osborne v. Ohio,261 the Supreme Court rejected an argument that the crim-
inalization of the private possession of child pornography in one’s home infringed
a constitutional “right to receive information in the privacy of [one’s] home,”262 con-
cluding instead that the prohibition was an appropriate measure to reduce the eco-
nomic incentive to exploit children sexually in order to supply the market for child
pornography.263 Thus, in terms of child pornography, as a matter of substantive consti-
tutional law, the Court has rejected libertarianism on the ground that the mere exis-
tence of child pornography creates a tangible harm to children that justifies treating
it as contraband.264
If Osborne is a sound statement of the legitimate sweep of governmental au-
thority under substantive constitutional law, then it becomes difficult to understand
why an investigative technique that does no more than enforce the government’s
substantive entitlement to prohibit even the “private” possession of child pornogra-
phy can be branded “unreasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
After Osborne, the possession of child pornography is not properly regarded as
“private” as a matter of substantive constitutional law; the government is entitled to
make even the entirely “private” possession of such material its affair because of
what is regarded as the harmful effect that such material has on third parties outside
the privacy of the home.265 Thus, the impact of recognizing a Fourth Amendment
right to secret child pornography in one’s home absent a warrant issued on probable
cause would be to reduce the ability of the government to enforce the child pornog-
raphy laws, thereby undermining the government’s ability to stem the demand for
child pornography. To be sure, a libertarian might argue that there is some cognizable
261 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
262 Id. at 108.
263 Id. at 108–11.
264 Id. 
265 Cf. Kenneth J. Melilli, Dog Sniffs, Technology, and the Mythical Constitutional Right
to Criminal Privacy, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357, 371–72 (2014) (“How can one be said
to enjoy a right to anything if, as soon as the state has good reason to believe that the citizen
might be exercising that right, the state can immediately put a stop to it?”).
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liberty interest in permitting people to indulge in their taste for child pornography
as long as they do so in their privacy of their homes, but that was precisely the
libertarian argument of the dissenters that failed to carry the day in Osborne as a
matter of substantive constitutional law.266 Once libertarians lose their argument for
protection of the purely “private” possession of child pornography as a matter of
substantive constitutional law, in turn, there is little reason to believe that it is
somehow “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to recognize
a cognizable liberty interest in secreting child pornography in one’s home (or else-
where), at least as long as all other aspects of the privacy of the home remain secure
absent the issuance of a warrant properly issued on probable cause.
As we have seen in Part I.A above, even the relatively robust libertarian concep-
tion of the Boyd era could not find a basis to protect the home from official scrutiny
when it contained contraband or other items in which the owner had no legitimate
property interest.267 The libertarian conception, in short, cannot identify any type of
constitutionally cognizable liberty interest compromised by a binary investigative
technique that discloses only the existence of contraband—at least once one agrees
that liberty, in the constitutional sense, does not embrace the right to secret contra-
band in one’s home. In short, precisely the reasons that the government may prohibit
even the purely “private” possession of contraband make it reasonable, in the con-
stitutional sense, for the government to utilize techniques that disclose the presence
of contraband (or other illegal activity), as long as no constitutionally cognizable
liberty interest is compromised by those techniques.
So it goes with any binary search; there is no tenable way to stretch the people’s
right to be secure from “unreasonable” search and seizure into a right to violate valid
laws without fear of official scrutiny. It is one thing to say that the Fourth Amend-
ment necessarily benefits the guilty when it limits official scrutiny of the innocent;
it is quite another to say that the Fourth Amendment offers the guilty “security”
from investigative techniques that compromise no interests of law-abiders. After all,
when the Constitution permits the government to treat a given activity as unlawful
even when conducted within the privacy of the home, it becomes impossible to think
of a right of the people to be “secure” when committing such crimes within the
home, at least when investigative techniques are used that pose no threat to the
security or liberty of law-abiders. Once it is agreed that the government has legiti-
mate reason to punish the possession of contraband wherever it may be found, it
becomes difficult to explain why an investigative technique that discloses the
presence of contraband and nothing else of interest should be regarded as constitu-
tionally “unreasonable” even though the government has good reason to concern
itself with contraband wherever it may be found.
266 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 139–45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
267 See supra notes 33–56 and accompanying text.
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Although, at first blush, binary search techniques utilized in the absence of indi-
vidualized suspicion may resemble the use of a general warrant to engage in indis-
criminate search and seizure, as we have seen, the intrusion accomplished by a
binary search involving no physical intrusion is far more limited than anything
regarded as unreasonable in the framing era.268 Although physical entry of the home
or other area otherwise concealed from public view compromises a variety of im-
portant privacy interests, if physical entry occurs only after a warrant has issued
based on probable cause generated by a binary search technique, then these remain-
ing interests are compromised only in a fashion authorized by the Fourth Amend-
ment. The binary search does no more than enable the authorities to overcome the
difficulties that usually attend assembling probable cause to search—and in that
fashion it advances the government’s legitimate interest in identifying all locations
at which contraband is present without compromising any liberty interest that the
government is constitutionally obligated to respect.269
Indeed, about the only libertarian virtue in constitutional limitations on binary
search techniques is restricting the use of these techniques to cases in which law
enforcement already has acquired probable cause to search will make enforcement
less efficient. One can fairly doubt, however, whether a coherent libertarianism can
be built on such a foundation. Although, for those who believe that the govern-
ment’s regulatory reach extends too far, there may be virtues in inefficiency; liber-
tarianism can take, at most, small comfort in knowing that not all lawbreakers are
apprehended. Indeed, it is passing strange to conceive of liberty as an incremental
reduction in the likelihood that one will get caught when breaking the law. Equally
important, if the government is entitled to define particular items as contraband that
may never be possessed, even within one’s home or similarly “private” area, then
it is surely reasonable to insist that the prohibition be enforced as effectively as
possible through techniques that do not compromise the interests of those who are
exercising constitutionally protected liberty within those private locations. It is more
than a little anomalous to take the position that it is constitutionally reasonable for
the government to restrict “liberty” by banning altogether the possession of an item
thought to produce cognizable evils, but only if the ban cannot be fully enforced.
To be sure, there may be something alarming to many sensibilities about an in-
vestigative technique with a seemingly limitless ability to detect wrongdoing.270 This
268 See supra notes 130–50 and accompanying text.
269 Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 255, at 129 (“The freedom to defy public norms that a
democratic citizenry requires is not a license to ignore democratically enacted laws. The
Fourth Amendment is not violated by searches and seizures that make criminals insecure.
It is violated by searches and seizures that rob the law-abiding of their security.”).
270 See, e.g., Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 299, 353 (2010). For a valuable
discussion about the concerns arising from highly accurate and reliable methods of law
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could explain, for example, at least part of the backlash against “red-light camera”
systems capable of detecting any vehicle that fails to come to a stop when required
at an intersection, which often encounter political opposition.271 Yet, whatever one’s
unease with perfect technological enforcement of the prohibition on running red
lights, it is impossible to speak coherently of a legal right to run a red light unless
a human being observes the offense. Unease with technological enforcement of a
substantively valid prohibition can properly fuel political debate, but it cannot sup-
ply a coherent legal libertarianism. After all, libertarians do not advocate inefficient
enforcement of all laws; presumably few, if any, libertarians argue that laws forbid-
ding the possession of nuclear weapons or deadly biological weapons should be only
imperfectly enforced. Instead, libertarians may seek imperfect enforcement of laws
which they regard as unwarranted restraints on liberty, but surely the proper ground
of debate is over the substance of those laws. On that score, technology that im-
proves the efficiency of enforcement may even aid the libertarian agenda by producing
“either a reduction in punishments across the board or a much better, and narrower,
definition of ‘wrongful conduct.’”272 But, if substantive law permits the government to
prohibit running a red light even if unobserved by human eyes—or possessing contra-
band within one’s own home—it becomes impossible to conceive of liberty, at least
in a legal sense, as embracing a right to break the law as long as no one is watching.
D. The Libertarian Conception and the Swath of the Contemporary
Regulatory State
The difficulties in articulating a libertarian argument for regulating the binary
search when substantive constitutional law recognizes no protected liberty interest
in the possession of contraband is no accident. As Professor Stuntz once observed
of the demise of the Boyd regime, a libertarian conception of the Fourth Amendment
could not be squared with emergence of a vigorous regulatory state in which the
zone of what was thought to be private activity beyond the reach of the regulatory
government radically shrank.273 One need not share Professor Stuntz’s skepticism
enforcement, see Christina M. Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to Limit and
When to Use Technology, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2008).
271 See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, First State to Adopt Photo Enforcement of Speed Laws,
Arizona Halts the Program, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2010, at A12. For an explication of red-
light camera technology, see Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, How Technology
Drives Vehicular Privacy, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 981, 992–93 (2006). For a
useful discussion of the objections to red-light cameras, see Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless
Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 199, 230–33 (2007).
272 Paul Rosenzweig, Privacy and Counter-Terrorism: The Pervasiveness of Data, 42
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 625, 645 (2010).
273 See William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1031–34 (1995).
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about the coherence of contemporary conceptions of privacy to agree that privacy’s
domain necessarily contracts when the regulatory reach of government expands.
When governmental power comes to be understood in relatively expansive terms,
a libertarian conception of the Fourth Amendment becomes untenable. If the gov-
ernment has a lawful basis for prohibiting the private possession of a particular item,
for example, it has a concomitant justification for treating the supposedly “private”
possession of that item as properly its business.
Indeed, as we have seen, even the libertarian regime of Boyd could not justify
libertarianism when it comes to the possession of contraband.274 There is, of course,
no coherent libertarianism that embraces a right to harm others, and when the gov-
ernment’s regulatory power expands based on policy judgments that previously un-
regulated conduct produces cognizable harms to third parties—as in the case of child
pornography—then offering constitutional protection to activities thought to harm
others lacks a coherent libertarian justification.275 One can disagree with the policy
arguments that are deployed to support the view that any number of regulated
activities harm third parties, but if that view is rejected as a matter of substantive
constitutional law, a powerful argument follows that investigative techniques that
disclose these harm-producing activities, and nothing else, are reasonable in the
constitutional sense.
Given the breadth of contemporary regulatory power, substantive constitutional
law rarely takes a libertarian cast, and for that reason the government’s power to
define items as contraband is largely uncircumscribed. The leading example where
libertarianism has made inroads on substantive constitutional law is the First Amend-
ment’s protection for freedom of speech and freedom of the press.276 In Stanley v.
Georgia,277 for example, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the private
possession of obscene materials that may not lawfully be distributed in public.278 It
follows that even a search technique that discloses only the existence of proscribable
obscenity impinges on a constitutionally protected liberty interest. In such cases, the
binary search doctrine becomes irrelevant—there is no such thing as a binary search
of the home for obscenity given the substantive constitutional right to possess ob-
scene material within the home.279 Thus, in Jacobsen, citing Stanley, the Court ex-
plained that its holding that a field test disclosing the presence of cocaine was not
274 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), rejected by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967).
275 For a useful discussion of the arguments that can be deployed to justify a wide variety
of government regulation consistent with a libertarian principle protecting conduct that pro-
duces no harm to others, see Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 139–81 (1999).
276 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
277 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
278 Id. at 564–68.
279 See id.
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subject to regulation under the Fourth Amendment was “confined to possession of
contraband. It is not necessarily the case that the purely ‘private’ possession of an
article that cannot be distributed in commerce is itself illegitimate.”280
Precisely because the First Amendment imposes limitations on the government’s
ability to treat some items as contraband, Fourth Amendment law is necessarily
structured to respect these limitations on regulatory powers, as Jacobsen acknowl-
edged. Beyond the example of the interaction between Stanley and the binary search
doctrine, the Court has held that warrants authorizing the seizure of materials that
are believed to be obscene must adequately circumscribe the discretion of officers
who execute the warrant in order to minimize the risk that a search or seizure will
burden First Amendment rights.281 The Court has also held that the seizure of al-
leged obscene materials violates the Fourth Amendment prior to an adjudication of
obscenity because of the risk that such a seizure will prevent the dissemination of
materials that turn out to be protected by the First Amendment.282 In such cases, the
Fourth Amendment imposes regulation on the authorities because of the risk that
search and seizure will exceed the power of the government to treat expressive
materials as contraband—a power that is limited by the First Amendment.283 Even
when it comes to the search or seizure of expressive materials, however, when there
is no risk that search-and-seizure powers are being used to exceed the power of
government to treat expressive materials as contraband, the Court applies ordinary
Fourth Amendment standards.284 Thus, these cases illustrate the interaction between
substantive constitutional law and the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.
The libertarian character of the First Amendment, however, imposes only mod-
est limitations on the power of government to define various items as contraband.
In Stanley, for example, the Court stressed that its holding “in no way infringes upon
the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other items, such
as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime. . . . No First Amendment rights are
280 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n.23 (1984).
281 See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485–86 (1965) (regarding a warrant authorizing
seizure of records relating to Communist Party); Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at
104 E. Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717, 731–33 (1961) (regarding a warrant authorizing seizure of
obscene materials).
282 See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 62–67 (1989).
283 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
284 See, e.g., New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 873–75 (1986) (holding that a
warrant to seize obscene materials is governed by ordinary Fourth Amendment standards,
because a valid warrant adequately protects First Amendment interests of a distributor);
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469–70 (1985) (stating that an undercover officer may
purchase potentially obscene materials, because such activities pose no threat to First Amend-
ment rights); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978) (holding that a warrant to
search a newspaper for photos documenting illegal conduct supported by probable cause
sufficiently protected First Amendment interests of newspaper).
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involved in most statutes making mere possession criminal.”285 And, when substantive
constitutional law permits the government to treat even seemingly “private” activity
as subject to regulatory authority, a libertarian conception of the Fourth Amendment
as creating a zone of privacy in which contraband may be securely secreted becomes
impossible to reconcile with substantive constitutional law.
In this connection, it bears noting that the Fourth Amendment has never been
understood to impose any independent limitation on the power of government to
define items as contraband and therefore not a legitimate source of privacy or other
cognizable liberty interests. The closest the Court has ever come to articulating a
libertarian understanding of the Fourth Amendment was when it held that a state
may not prohibit the possession of contraceptives by married couples in Griswold v.
Connecticut.286 In Griswold, the Court famously invoked a number of constitutional
provisions, including the Fourth Amendment and the possibility of police “search[ing]
the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms,” to construct a “zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”287 Yet, Griswold did not bear
much in the way of fruit for a libertarian conception of the Fourth Amendment. As
it expanded Griswold to recognize a right of unmarried persons to possess contra-
ceptives, the Court abandoned reliance on the Fourth Amendment, characterizing
the right at issue as one protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.288 Nor did Griswold produce a “zone of privacy” in the “marital bedroom”
or elsewhere in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; even “the sacred precincts of the
marital bedroom” are subject to search on what is regarded as sufficient justification,
even when its occupants lie naked and asleep therein.289 Indeed, the perils in branding
any “private” location as free from search and seizure are obvious. Fourth Amendment
reasonableness cannot tenably be translated into immunity from official scrutiny.
E. The Incoherence of the Libertarian Conception
All this should illustrate an even more fundamental problem with the libertarian
conception—the incoherence of any libertarian boundary on governmental search-
and-seizure authority.
285 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 567, 568 n.11 (1969).
286 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
287 Id. at 485.
288 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977).
289 See Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007) (per curiam). The Fourth
Amendment does ordinarily require, however, that the authorities knock and announce their
authority prior to making a forcible entry of a residence, although that requirement too can
be dispensed with on what is regarded as “sufficient justification.” See, e.g., United States v.
Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36–40 (2003); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934–36 (1995).
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The Boyd regime, whatever its defects, used an intelligible line—the boundaries
of property rights—to define the boundaries of Fourth Amendment protection.290 But,
as we have seen, tying the Fourth Amendment to property law proved untenable.291
Contemporary Fourth Amendment libertarianism, however, has yet to articulate any
other boundary on governmental authority to replace property rights. Morgan Cloud
can stirringly write, for example, that “[t]he Fourth Amendment enacts a vision of
the individual as an autonomous agent, empowered to act and believe and express
himself free from government interference,”292 but if we do not use property law to
demarcate the boundaries of individual autonomy, what is to take its place? Assert-
ing a right to possess cocaine in order to intoxicate oneself is one tenable notion of
individual autonomy, but if not tied to property rights, this conception seems little
more than license for the judiciary to enact its preferred version of moral philosophy
as constitutional law. And, as we have seen, a libertarianism that aspires to do no more
than reduce the efficiency with which the government can enforce concededly valid
laws, while offering no meaningful protection to innocent persons who are actually
exercising constitutionally protected liberty, is neither coherent nor terribly attractive.
At best, a principled Fourth Amendment libertarianism might claim that the
constitutional requirement of reasonableness should be understood to embrace a lib-
ertarian harm principle that forbids search and seizure except when some harm is
threatened to third parties. Yet, as we have seen, the government will often be able
to demonstrate that seemingly private activities qualify for regulation under some
version of the harm principle. One might try to identify discrete privacy interests
that should mark out the limits of governmental investigative authority; for example,
Anthony Amsterdam framed what he viewed as “the ultimate question” regarding
the reach of the Fourth Amendment as “whether, if the particular form of surveil-
lance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated . . . the amount of privacy
and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent
with the aims of a free and open society.”293 Yet, if under substantive constitutional
law, the existence of a “free and open society” is thought consistent with a prohibi-
tion on even seemingly private activity because of the harmful effects it is believed
to generate, it is unclear why an investigative technique that does no more than iden-
tify such a violation of law should be regarded as constitutionally unreasonable.
Beyond that, it is far from clear that Professor Amsterdam’s approach can pro-
duce a workable Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Kyllo, for example, the Court
rejected a test for a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment that
would require disclosure of “intimate details,” cautioning that a jurisprudence that
290 See supra Part I.A.
291 See supra Part I.B.
292 Cloud, supra note 51, at 619 (internal quotation marks omitted).
293 Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 403.
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protected only interests regarded as meaningful or important would be an invitation to
unbounded judicial subjectivity.294 That concern argues against Professor Amsterdam’s
view as well; it would be no easy task to determine what constraints on search and
seizure are necessary to produce a “free and open society.” Thus, if Kyllo embraces
a relatively low threshold for Fourth Amendment regulation, that view is not without
pragmatic justification. In this fashion, even in the seeming libertarianism of Kyllo,
lurks Fourth Amendment pragmatism.
As we have seen, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence faces challenges unimag-
inable to the framers.295 To assess a host of novel investigative techniques, from
gathering telephone records from phone companies to Internet-based searches of
computers that detect only illegal activity, the libertarian conception offers little
more than slogans.
For example, the government’s collection of vast quantities of noncontent data
from telephone companies, such as records reflecting originating and terminating
numbers and the length of all telephone calls, which are then placed into a database
available to be queried, but solely for purposes of counterterrorism investigations
on the basis of reasonable suspicion, has provoked considerable and quite under-
standable public controversy.296 Yet, because the data is collected from telephone
companies, a libertarian conception rooted in property rights supplies no basis for
telephone users to object to data collection even on a scale this vast. Other formula-
tions of the libertarian conception, however, can identify no coherent boundary on
the limits on investigative authority. Even more important, surely any fair assess-
ment of the constitutional “reasonableness” of such a program should consider the
national security interests underlying the collection of the data, as well as the
limitations on its use, just as it should consider as well the special threat to liberty
posed when data is collected on a wholesale rather than a case-by-case basis.
The pragmatic conception, by demanding an assessment of all of the relevant
costs and benefits of an investigative technique, at least provides a vehicle for as-
sessing the constitutionality of a search program, as difficult as the process of bal-
ancing may sometimes be.
To this, one might object that if the Fourth Amendment is concerned with no
more than pragmatic balancing, there is little reason to require constitutional regula-
tion of search and seizure; legislatures could be thought fully competent, if not supe-
rior, to the judiciary to engage in this type of cost-benefit analysis, at least when search
and seizure is not targeted at discrete groups not likely to be fairly represented in the
294 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38–39 (2001).
295 See supra notes 130–50 and accompanying text.
296 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Nation Will Gain by Discussing Surveillance, Expert Tells Pri-
vacy Board, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2013, at A16. For a description of the program and the legal
rationale supporting it, see In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring Production of
Tangible Things from [Redacted ], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
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political process.297 Yet, it is far from clear that nothing is gained when the process
of cost-benefit analysis is moved from the legislature to an independent judiciary.
The classic justification for a warrant requirement is eminently pragmatic—a
neutral and detached judicial officer is thought more likely to assess with integrity
the balance between liberty and order than an “officer engaged in the often competi-
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”298 Legislative balancing involves a similar
problem—leaving the balance between liberty and order to politically accountable
legislators means that Fourth Amendment rights are held hostage to the whims of
transient political majorities that may overreact to passing fears of crime. Perhaps
even more important, legislatures may be less than fully sensitive to the long-term
costs of enhancing search-and-seizure authority for immediate political advantage.
In his scholarship, for example, Professor Stuntz stressed the desire of politicians to
be tough on crime as a response to fear of crime resulting in increasingly harsh sub-
stantive criminal laws.299 He bemoaned the failure of constitutional law to regulate
substantive criminal law and urged more vigorous judicial regulation of substantive
criminal law to address the problem, while recognizing that the Constitution’s text
does not support much in the way of regulation of substantive criminal law.300 The
Fourth Amendment, however, insulates the process of balancing liberty and order
from political overreaching when it comes to search and seizure by leaving the
balancing to an independent judiciary. The fact that the Constitution’s text imposes
special limitations on search and seizure surely is a powerful indication that we are
not free to regard questions of search and seizure identically to others that are left
to the ordinary push-and-pull of the political process.
One might nevertheless regard a system that gives legislatures largely uncon-
strained ability to indulge their punitive instincts by enacting harsh substantive
criminal laws while maintaining judicial regulation of search-and-seizure powers as
of little value to the protection of liberty, but there may be particular virtue in
297 For an elaborate defense of this approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see
Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless Searches and
Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93 (2007). For some illustrations of how such an approach might
work, see, for example, Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the
Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 851–61 (2011), and Christopher Slobogin,
Government Dragnets, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 136–41 (2010).
298 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (footnotes omitted); accord, e.g.,
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
585–86 (1980); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316–17 (1972); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948).
299 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 236–41
(2011). For a similar argument that legislatures are likely to be unduly sensitive to the inter-
ests of law enforcement, see Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the
Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the
Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1088–94 (1993).
300 See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 299, at 208–12, 227–35.
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ensuring that the government’s powers of search and seizure are limited, even if its
ability to enact substantive criminal laws is largely unfettered. One reason is found
in the Constitution’s text—the Fourth Amendment identifies a constitutional prin-
ciple not to be left to ordinary majoritarian politics. Beyond that, if one believes that
majoritarian institutions are likely to overvalue the interests of law enforcement,
then there is good reason to insist on judicial review of search and seizure.301
It may be that permitting majoritarian institutions to indulge what may be tran-
sitory political support for overly aggressive search and seizure has the potential to
change political culture in ways fundamentally hostile to republican government.
Justice Jackson famously made the point not long after his return from Nuremberg:
[O]ne need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a peo-
ple possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these
rights to know that the human personality deteriorates and dig-
nity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and pos-
sessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure
by the police.302
On this view, the political process may undervalue the long-term costs of enlarging
search-and-seizure power, and the electorate, once accustomed to vigorous law-
enforcement power, may fail to appreciate those costs when the reality of such
power becomes ingrained in political culture.303
Justice Jackson was one of our greatest legal pragmatists, and yet it was he who
wrote that Fourth Amendment rights “are not mere second-class rights but belong
in the catalog of indispensable freedoms.”304 Indeed, many pragmatists argue that
high value should be placed on any number of liberty interests that are compromised
301 See Dripps, supra note 299, at 1094–97.
302 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). For
a discussion of the impact of Justice Jackson’s experiences at the Nuremberg war-crimes trial
on his subsequent jurisprudence, see NORBERT EHRENFREUND, THE NUREMBERG LEGACY:
HOW THE NAZI WAR CRIMES TRIALS CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY 134–36 (2007).
303 For a more elaborate argument justifying the Fourth Amendment’s assignment of the
task of assessing the reasonableness of search and seizure to the judiciary, see Wasserstrom
& Seidman, supra note 3, at 106–07.
304 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 180 (Jackson, J., dissenting). On Justice Jackson’s legal pragma-
tism, see NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES 363–65 (2010). See also JEFFREY D. HOCKETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF HUGO L. BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND ROBERT H.
JACKSON 241–47 (1996); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES
OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 246–50 (1988); Gregory S. Chernack, The Clash of Two
Worlds: Justice Robert H. Jackson, Institutional Pragmatism, and Brown, 72 TEMP. L. REV.
51, 51–53 (1999).
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by search and seizure.305 Thus, although some may criticize Fourth Amendment
pragmatism as undervaluing liberty interests,306 nothing inherent to legal pragmatism
requires that liberty interests receive less than their due. One can embrace pragma-
tism without denigrating the importance of the liberty interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment when striking a balance between liberty and order.
CONCLUSION
Jardines has not brought an end to the tension between Fourth Amendment lib-
ertarianism and pragmatism. While Jardines represents the libertarian conception, as
we have seen, its libertarianism is stunted and uncertain. For that reason, it is unlikely
to produce conceptual clarity as to the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The author has, of course, done little to conceal his impulse toward Fourth
Amendment pragmatism. A binary search of a home illuminates the inquiry into the
central meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it presents a paradigm case for
Fourth Amendment libertarianism. A binary search, if left unregulated, involves
official scrutiny of the contents of the home without constitutional constraint; but,
as we have seen, there is ultimately no coherent libertarian case for restricting binary
searches. To the contrary, the best argument in defense of Jardines is pragmatic—a
binary search involving a physical intrusion might create sufficient alarm or embar-
rassment to innocent homeowners to justify regulation on pragmatic grounds, al-
though the matter is hardly free from doubt. For nonintrusive binary searches, however,
there is no coherent libertarian objection, and the pragmatic arguments seem to weigh
against restraining such techniques. If the libertarian account cannot offer a convinc-
ing account for restricting the binary search, it cannot offer any discrete space in
which an individual is free from official scrutiny. Thus, while libertarian Fourth
Amendment rhetoric permeates the decision in Jardines, and indeed a fair swath of
Fourth Amendment doctrine, it is rather a dead end. Whatever the difficulties in
reaching a pragmatic accommodation between liberty and order, the Fourth Amend-
ment leaves us no other choice.
The impulse to understand the Fourth Amendment in libertarian terms among
a people whose Constitution was written amid fear of governmental overreaching
is doubtless powerful. Indeed, there are some who argue that substantive constitu-
tional law has granted too much leeway to the regulatory state and ought to return
305 See, e.g., Castiglione, supra note 2, at 699–709 (arguing that dignity should receive
greater weight in Fourth Amendment balancing); Colb, supra note 17, at 1644–47 (arguing
for enhanced Fourth Amendment protection when search or seizure implicates particularly
sensitive and constitutionally recognized interests); Reinert, supra note 79, at 1485–91 (arguing
that balancing must consider the impact of search and seizure on individuals’ relation with
government); Sundby, supra note 105, at 1796–802 (arguing that Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence should give greater weight to trust of the citizenry as a constitutional value).
306 See supra text accompanying note 96.
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to a regime in which regulatory power is far more circumscribed.307 The account
offered here is not so much unsympathetic to libertarianism as it is to the contention
that when libertarian claims are rejected as a matter of substantive constitutional
law, they can nevertheless be somehow smuggled into the inquiry into Fourth
Amendment reasonableness. Fourth Amendment pragmatism offers a coherent way
to think about the challenges facing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; Fourth
Amendment libertarianism, adrift in a sea of substantive law that largely rejects
libertarian claims, does not. If libertarianism one day makes greater inroads in sub-
stantive constitutional law, then it is likely that what is regarded as “unreasonable
search and seizure” will change as well. We should not expect a malleable and
contingent concept such as reasonableness, however, to do the work of substantive
constitutional law. Substantive constitutional law, by and large, rejects libertarianism.
It is only natural that the Fourth Amendment’s carefully calibrated prohibition on
“unreasonable” search and seizure should follow suit.
307 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 257–71 (2004); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 19–20, 24–25 (1985).
